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"Not at all, not at all, my dear sir! Let me see, I don’t think I know 
your name?" 
"Yes, yes, my dear sir – and I do know your name, Mr. Bilbo 
Baggins. And you do know my name, though you don't remember 
that I belong to it. I am Gandalf, and Gandalf means me! 
J.R.R. Tolkien, The Hobbit: or There and Back Again 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Should we deal with Frege’s Puzzle on semantic grounds? Is the cognitive value of 
language an aspect of meaning? Frege himself assumed an affirmative answer to those 
questions, and so did many direct reference theorists, such as David Kaplan and John 
Perry. Even though they defend a theory that is anti-Fregean by nature, they share the view 
that it is semantics’ business to account for Frege’s Puzzle and cognitive value. There are 
two traditional ways to do so in referentialist semantics. One is via character and the other 
via reflexive content. My aim in this dissertation is to argue that both fail. To do that, I first 
examine what exactly Frege’s Puzzle is, and if what traditionally goes under the name of 
“Frege’s Puzzle” really corresponds to the puzzle that Frege himself formulated. I then 
examine how the solutions to the puzzle in terms of character and reflexive content are 
supposed to work for indexicals, where they are most appealing, and for proper names. I 
argue that there is no version of these solutions that is able to account for all the relevant 
phenomena. I conclude that, if this is the case, then we have serious reasons to suspect that 
Frege’s Puzzle should not be explained by semantics, and that cognitive value is not an 
aspect of meaning as it is often supposed. 
Keywords: Frege’s Puzzle; cognitive value; reference; semantics; epistemology. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Resumo  
 
Devemos lidar com o Problema de Frege dentro da semântica? É o valor cognitivo da 
linguagem um aspecto do significado? O próprio Frege assumiu uma resposta afirmativa a 
essas questões, assim como vários teóricos da referência direta, como David Kaplan e John 
Perry. Apesar de defenderem uma teoria semântica que é anti-fregeana por natureza, eles 
compartilham da concepção de que é tarefa da semântica resolver o Problema de Frege e 
explicar fenômenos de valor cognitivo. Há duas maneiras tradicionais de se fazer isso 
numa semântica referencialista. Uma é via caráter e outra é via conteúdo reflexivo. Meu 
objetivo nesta dissertação é argumentar que ambas falham. Para isso, primeiramente 
examino o que é exatamente o Problema de Frege, e se o que tradicionalmente é chamado 
de “Problema de Frege” na literatura corresponde ao que Frege tinha em mente. Depois 
disso, explico como supostamente funcionam as soluções ao Problema de Frege através do 
caráter e através do conteúdo reflexivo no caso dos indexicais – onde elas são mais 
plausíveis – e no caso de nomes próprios. Argumento que nenhuma versão dessas soluções 
é bem sucedida em explicar todos os fenômenos que devem ser explicados. Concluo então 
que, se esse é o caso, então temos boas razões para acreditar que o Problema de Frege não 
deve ser solucionado dentro da semântica, e que o valor cognitivo não é um aspecto do 
significado como comumente se supõe. 
Palavras-chave: Problema de Frege; valor cognitivo; referência; semântica; 
epistemologia.   
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Introduction 
 
It is very common and intuitive to believe that language and thought bear an 
extremely intimate relation. Indeed, we frequently have the idea that language is some kind 
of vehicle for thought, a linguistic clothing that we employ in order to externalize the 
content of our minds. After all, we seemingly think via language, and when we want to 
convey our thoughts we simply voice out loud what is already in our heads. In this picture, 
language is somewhat a mirror or reflection of thought. Frege was no exception to this 
view. For him, language and thought are indeed closely connected: thoughts are expressed 
in the form of words and their parts correspond to the parts of the sentences used to express 
them
1
. 
Despite being best known for his contribution to the philosophy of language, 
his primary philosophical interest was in thought, and not in language per se
2
. He explicitly 
says this in Frege (1956). However, thoughts are immaterial things. He could not 
manipulate them or look at them under a microscope for examination. The only way to 
access them, Frege believed, is through their linguistic embodiment. So, he had to turn to 
language in order to study thought; that is, he had to engage in semantics. Given his goal, it 
is clear that semantics does not have much importance in itself. Since his main 
philosophical concern was the thought, not language, an investigation of the semantic 
properties of linguistic expressions is relevant only if it captures and explains the 
functioning of thought. Thus, a semantic theory that does not account for the cognitive 
dimension of language is completely misguided. In other words, he believed that an 
account of the cognitive aspects of language must not be a secondary interest or a 
byproduct of a semantic theory, but rather its main concern. Semantics and epistemology, 
therefore, should be inextricably associated
3
. 
The influence of this idea can hardly be overstated. With this conception, Frege 
established a model of semantics that would become orthodox during the 20
th
 century: any 
                                                          
1
 Cf. Frege (1963) p. 1. 
2
 It is important to stress the fact that Frege was not interested in the psychological process of thinking – 
which perhaps should concern psychologists – but rather in the “eternal structure of thought”, as Burge 
(2005) points out. What this means is that his interest was in the form of rational thinking, in the laws of 
logic, assertion, judgment and inference, and not in how our mental acts come about. 
3
 As we will see in chapter 1, this interpretation of Frege is overtly simplified. For the purposes of this 
introduction, however, it is adequate enough. 
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semantic theory must not only explain the relation between words and world, but also the 
relation between language and thought. In this Fregean approach to semantics
4
, questions 
about the cognitive value (or cognitive significance) of language should be among the 
primary concerns of semanticists. This is why Frege’s famous puzzle of identity (which is 
not restricted to identity) was and still is a much debated topic in the philosophy of 
language and mind. The puzzle can be roughly stated as follows: how can sentences of the 
form a=a be non-informative and trivial and sentences of the form a=b be informative if a 
and b are coreferential
5
? It seems evident that the same speaker can be bored by sentences 
of the first form but be rather shocked when presented to the sentences of the second form. 
For example, a speaker may find the sentence “Jack the Ripper is Jack the Ripper” idiotic, 
although she would (presumably) be terrified to be told that “Jack the Ripper is Will”, 
where “Will” is the name of her husband (for a less dramatic case, think of Aunt May 
being told that “Spider-Man is Peter Parker”). How can the mere substitution of 
coreferential terms affect the cognitive value of those sentences? If semantics must be 
epistemically sensitive as Frege believed, then it must provide an answer to this question in 
terms of the semantic properties of the expressions involved. In other words, cognitive 
value must be explained in terms of the (literal) meaning of these expressions. 
This is what became known in the literature as Frege’s Puzzle. Frege originally 
stated it using schemas, or sentences involving proper names and definite descriptions, but 
it is a much more general phenomenon. Given Frege’s philosophical interests and his view 
of semantics as a means to study thought, it is not surprising that this puzzle is seen by him 
as perhaps the central problem in the philosophy of language. 
What is striking, however, is that even with the widespread reaction against 
Frege that started in the late sixties, many philosophers also felt the need to deal with this 
puzzle on semantic grounds. In other words, many philosophers that eschewed Fregean 
semantics worked and still work under the Fregean assumption that it is semantics’ 
business to account for the problem of cognitive value, i.e., to deal with Frege’s Puzzle in 
its various forms. Among these philosophers were some paradigms of direct reference such 
as David Kaplan and John Perry. They too felt the pull of the puzzle and devoted a 
                                                          
4
 I will use “Fregean model of semantics” and “Fregean approach to semantics” as synonyms, meaning the 
idea that explaining cognitive value is a criterion of adequacy for semantic theories.  
5
 Note that it is not entirely obvious what a=a and a=b are supposed to represent. I will deal with this 
problem in the first chapter. 
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significant part of their work to solve it. In sum, a great number of philosophers abandoned 
Fregean semantics after the sixties and adopted the so called direct reference theory; 
however, they did not abandon the Fregean approach, that is, the idea that semantics is 
inseparable from epistemology and that it must contemplate the cognitive dimension of 
language. They tried to accommodate anti-Fregean semantics in the Fregean model. 
 Obviously, if these philosophers abandoned Frege, the famous and elegant 
solution for the puzzle that he offered in Über Sinn und Bedeutung was of no use to them. 
They had to employ only the tools available to the new semantic theory that emerged, 
which is Millian in spirit. The big problem is that Frege himself rejected all kinds of 
Millian semantics precisely because they are incapable of explaining Frege’s Puzzle. The 
reason is the following. Mill maintained that the semantic value or content of a name is 
exhausted by its reference. There is no other content associated with the name that has any 
kind of semantic relevance. Of course, a name can evoke images, descriptions or any sort 
of qualitative content for a speaker or even for a whole community, but this associated 
content does not perform any semantic function whatsoever. 
According to Frege, however, if the sole semantic value of a name is its 
reference, then the sentences of the form a=a and a=b would express the same thing: the 
trivial proposition that a=a. It would not matter if we substitute x in a=x for a or b; their 
semantic value would be exactly the same entity, and hence the same content would be 
expressed either way. For Frege this is absurd, for it is possible, as noted in the examples 
above, that a competent speaker accepts one but sincerely denies the other. How can this 
be the case if both sentences express precisely the same thing? If they say the same thing, 
they ought to have exactly the same cognitive value. Different attitudes should be caused 
by different contents. Millian semantics has the consequence that a speaker may not fully 
capture or fail to recognize a proposition expressed by sentences that he fully understands 
or, worse yet, that he himself expresses. In other terms, it generates a split between what is 
expressed by a sentence and what is captured by the speaker’s mind. In Millian semantics, 
a difference in cognitive value does not necessarily reflect an objective semantic 
difference. The so desired unity between semantics and epistemology seems to fall apart. It 
appears that this kind of referentialist semantics is not capable of dealing with the cognitive 
phenomena that were so important to Frege. 
14 
 
The same problem plagues direct reference. If the Millian spirit returns, the 
difficulties in explaining cognitive value on semantic grounds return as well. Direct 
reference theorists argue that not only names have their semantic values exhausted by their 
referents, but also indexicals, natural kind terms and even some uses of definite 
descriptions
6
. As we saw, Millian semantics seems to generate a disagreement between 
what is expressed by sentences and the cognitive life of the speakers: even if it is possible 
to have distinct attitudes towards the sentences a=a and a=b, they nevertheless express 
exactly the same (singular) proposition. Perhaps the most emblematic example of this split 
between semantics and cognition in direct reference is the poor Pierre, who in virtue of 
accepting both the English sentence “London is not pretty” and the French sentence 
“Londres est jolie”, believes that London is pretty and not pretty at the same time, for the 
semantic value of both “London” and “Londres” is just London and the propositions they 
express are identical. The Fregean marriage between semantics and epistemology seems to 
have gone through a terrible divorce. 
How can direct reference theorists account for Frege’s Puzzle if Millian 
semantics seems ill suited to this purpose by its very nature? Despite initial appearances, 
the new and more sophisticated Millians have good resources at their disposal for dealing 
with cognitive value. There are two main ways to pursue the solution to the puzzle on 
semantic grounds: one via character, most prominently defended by Kaplan, and other via 
reflexive content, most prominently defended by Perry. These solutions became somewhat 
standard, especially the solution in terms of character in the case of the indexical version of 
the puzzle. Direct reference theorists, even being Millian heirs, managed to find their way 
out of Frege’s Puzzle while still conforming to the Fregean approach to semantics. The 
problem is, I think, that these solutions do not work. 
My purpose in this dissertation is twofold. I want first to investigate what 
exactly Frege’s Puzzle is, and then argue that the traditional direct reference attempts to 
solve it on semantic grounds fail. If I am right and they do fail, this lends extra weight to 
Wettstein’s (1986) famous challenge to the Fregean criterion of adequacy for semantics: if 
the most promising referentialist resources available to deal with the puzzle are unable to 
do it adequately, then we have very good reasons to suspect that explaining cognitive value 
should not be the semanticist’s business in the first place. In other terms, if character and 
                                                          
6
 This point about definite descriptions is not uncontroversial, however. 
15 
 
reflexive content cannot explain all relevant phenomena of cognitive value successfully, 
then it seems that cognitive value is not an aspect of meaning after all, and we might 
consider abandoning the Fregean approach to semantics. 
In the first chapter, I first present the general puzzle that commonly goes under 
the name of “Frege’s Puzzle” in the literature. I then investigate if this general puzzle 
really corresponds to Frege’s own version of the puzzle. To do that, I try to dispel some 
misunderstandings that arise in relation to the way Frege poses the puzzle in Über Sinn und 
Bedeutung. His formulation in this work is rather unfortunate on several grounds. A better 
understanding of what Frege had in mind with the puzzle may help to understand what is 
essential to its formulation, and what exactly is the problem he believed to be solving. This 
is especially important given Glezakos’ (2009) charges against Frege’s formulation of the 
puzzle: she argues that he cannot pose it in a theory neutral manner, so we should not be 
puzzled by it at all. 
In the second chapter, I deal with the indexical version of Frege’s Puzzle. I 
introduce Kaplan’s theory of indexicals and explain how it is supposed to solve the puzzle 
in terms of character. I argue that neither his nor some modified versions of character can 
account for cognitive value successfully. I also present Perry’s theory of reflexive content 
and how it manages to apparently solve the puzzle for indexical expressions. I then show 
why it fails. 
In the third chapter I present the puzzle as arising for proper names. I argue that 
any attempt to solve it in terms of character requires a major deviation from Kaplan’s 
original theory and from standard referentialism, and that these attempts ultimately fail as 
well. I then briefly explain how reflexive content could perhaps account for the cognitive 
value of names, but not on semantic grounds. If this is right, then no aspect of the meaning 
of directly referential expressions is able to solve Frege’s Puzzle, and thus we have 
compelling reasons to believe that cognitive value is not a feature of meaning. 
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1. Frege’s Puzzle and cognitive value 
 
1.1 Introducing the general puzzle 
Suppose you are a New Yorker accustomed to seeing Spider-Man swinging by 
the buildings in Manhattan. You often read about his incredible doings in the newspapers 
and see him on TV every other day. You admire his strength and righteousness. You also 
happen to live right next to a nerdy and unremarkable kid called Peter Parker who is 
always being bullied by his schoolmates. You even have given him a ride to the library 
once or twice. Imagine your surprise if you encounter the following newspaper headline on 
your way to work: “Spider-Man is Peter Parker!”. That very day, you return home and find 
so many press vehicles and journalists on your street that you are unable to count them. 
They want to interview you, hoping to get a glimpse at Parker’s life, and you are harassed 
for several days. You learn that his poor aunt was so shocked by this news that she suffered 
a heart attack and is now hospitalized. With Parker as inspiration, an anti-bullying 
organization called “Spidey’s Friends” is founded and nerdy kids everywhere start 
standing up against their bullies. The mayor even names a high school after Peter Parker. 
After the bombastic headline, life in New York City is dramatically (and perhaps forever) 
changed. 
Now, imagine that instead of “Spider-Man is Peter Parker!” the headline was 
“Spider-Man is Spider-Man!” or “Peter Parker is Peter Parker!”. Would those headlines 
cause such generalized commotion and such profound changes in the city life? The answer 
seems obvious: no. The life of New Yorkers would go on just as the same. At most, the 
responsible editor would be fired for wasting the front page with such a boring triviality. 
There would be no harassment, no heart attack and unfortunately no anti-bullying 
organization. These headlines would be just silly. 
But how can we explain such drastic difference in the outcome of those 
headlines? The names “Spider-Man” and “Peter Parker” are names of the same individual. 
If this the case, then the sentences “Peter Parker is Peter Parker” and “Spider-Man is Peter 
Parker” should say precisely the same thing about that individual, i.e., that he is one and 
the same. But it seems obvious that they do not. How could they? The first sentence is 
completely uninteresting, while the second is capable of enormously affecting the behavior 
17 
 
of a whole community. How can the mere substitution of one name for another so greatly 
modify the impact that a sentence has on the speakers’ cognition if those names refer to the 
same individual? How come one is trivial and the other informative? 
Examples like this one abound. Consider the following set S of sentences
7
:  
a. Hesperus is Hesperus 
b. Cicero is Cicero 
c. Batman is Batman 
d. Walter White is Walter White 
e. Darth Vader is Darth Vader 
f. Freddie Mercury is Freddie Mercury 
All sentences in set S seem pretty trivial and uninteresting. No one in her right 
mind would assert one of them literally and in all seriousness. Now, compare set S with set 
S’: 
i. Hesperus is Phosphorus  
ii. Cicero is Tully  
iii. Batman is Bruce Wayne 
iv. Walter White is Heisenberg 
v. Darth Vader is Anakin Skywalker  
vi. Freddie Mercury is Farrokh Bulsara 
The difference is striking. Sentence (i) expresses
8
 an important astronomical 
discovery, while sentence (a) does not. Sentence (iv) expresses what Albuquerque police 
spent the five seasons of Breaking Bad trying to figure out, while everybody knew that 
sentence (d) was true since the beginning of the story. Sentence (c) is silly to everybody in 
Gotham City, but sentence (iii) would cause a fuzz similar to the Peter Parker/Spider-Man 
case above. Sentence (v) expresses one of the most dramatic revelations in movie history, 
but not sentence (e). Even though the names occurring in those pairs of sentences refer to 
the same thing, these sentences have distinct impacts on the cognitive life of speakers: Set 
                                                          
7
 I present the puzzle in terms of sentences, but the point could very well be made in terms of sentence tokens 
or utterances. 
8
 I am obviously not using the term “express” here in the sense of expressing a proposition. This term must 
be understood in the loosest sense possible, without any theoretical commitments. I just mean that they 
communicate or convey such information. 
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S contains only trivialities, while sentences in set S’ convey important information that 
could affect the speakers’ behavior in often drastic ways. A speaker may even accept 
unquestionably all sentences in set S and at the same time doubt or vehemently deny every 
single sentence in set S’ without being considered crazy or irrational. Let us call the 
properties that a sentence has that are capable of affecting the speaker’s attitudes towards it 
its cognitive value. Thus, the triviality of sentences in set S and the informativeness of 
sentences in set S’ are aspects of their cognitive value. 
Identity statements are not the only sentences that may differ in cognitive 
value. Sentences predicating properties of an object also may exhibit the same sort of 
cognitive difference. Consider these two sentences: 
a. Freddie Mercury is one of the greatest rock singers of all time  
b. Farrokh Bulsara is one of the greatest rock singers of all time 
I may strongly believe sentence (a), but start a violent argument with you if 
you assert sentence (b). How can this be possible if we are talking about the same person 
and predicating exactly the same thing of him? How can my attitude towards the first be 
different than my attitude towards the second? It could be argued that our disagreement 
arises because I am not competent with the name “Farrokh Bulsara”. But this is not the 
case. Suppose he is my brother, but he managed to hide his artistic career from me all his 
life, so I am quite dubious of his singing abilities. I am then as competent as possible with 
both “Farrokh Bulsara” and “Freddie Mercury”. Yet, I believe that sentence (b) is false, 
while believing that sentence (a) is the most obvious truth ever known to man. A difference 
in cognitive value, then, does not arise by lack of competence with the relevant proper 
names. 
 It gets worse. Proper names are not to blame: definite descriptions, indexicals 
and kind terms also affect the cognitive value of the sentences in which they occur. 
Consider these sentences: 
a. The morning star is the morning star 
b. The morning star is the evening star 
c. The morning star is bright 
d. The evening star is bright 
19 
 
 
a. I am me [Bruce Wayne pointing at himself] 
b. I am he [Bruce Wayne pointing at some footage of Batman on TV] 
c. I fight criminals at night [said by Bruce Wayne in his Batman suit] 
d. He fights criminals at night [said by Alfred pointing at Bruce Wayne] 
 
a. Furze is furze 
b. Furze is gorse 
c. Furze has thorns 
d. Gorse has thorns 
It seems clear that the cognitive value of those sentences is different, even 
though the expressions flanking the copula refer to the same thing. Sentences (a) are trivial, 
while sentences (b) are informative. A speaker can sincerely accept (c) sentences and at the 
same time sincerely reject (d) sentences, and vice-versa. Remember that this difference is 
not due to any kind of linguistic incompetence: the speaker masters completely the use of 
every referring expression contained in those sentences, an even so their cognitive values 
are distinct. 
The problem in its most general form, then, is this: how can the substitution of 
coreferential expressions (names, indexicals, definite descriptions, etc.) affect the cognitive 
value of a sentence? What accounts for the epistemic properties that sentences exhibit, 
such as triviality and informativeness, and their potential to affect the behavior of 
speakers? Is cognitive value an aspect of the meaning of those sentences or of something 
else? These questions are extremely important. They concern the relationship between 
meaning, reference, logic and the epistemic dimension of language, as well as the question 
of how we acquire and process information by linguistic means. This problem is what 
became known in the literature as Frege’s Puzzle, and it dominated much of the 
philosophy of language ever since it was introduced.
9
 
                                                          
9 It is worth noting that I presented the puzzle here only on behavioral grounds, i.e., considering only the way 
speakers produce and react to certain sentences (or their utterances). I believe this is the best way to set up 
the puzzle, because it does not involve (as far as I am aware) any problematic theoretical assumptions. In 
other words, setting up the problem based on the observed behavior associated with certain sentences (or 
their utterances) avoids any prior commitments regarding the determination of their syntactical and logical 
form, their truth-conditional content and the relation of those features with their epistemic profiles. The 
puzzle, as presented here, rests only on the general fact that we often refer to and think about the same object 
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Yet, it is not obvious that this puzzle, as presented above, corresponds exactly 
to the puzzle that Frege himself was concerned with. This puzzle’s precise nature is a 
matter of debate, given that Frege’s formulation involves many more subtleties than have 
been presented so far. There are several interpretations on the market (e.g. Salmon (1986); 
Salmon (1992); Mendelsohn (2005); Dickie (2008)) which are far from reaching 
consensus. This is quite remarkable, since much of the philosophy of language revolved 
around a puzzle whose precise features are subject to significant disagreement (Dickie 
(2008), for example, argues that Frege had not one, but two puzzles that we have 
inadvertedly lumped together). 
Especially worrisome, however, are the interpretations contained in Glezakos 
(2009) and in Taschek (1992). Glezakos claimed that the puzzle does not even get off the 
ground, because it presupposes, in order to be posed, the very notion that Frege is aiming 
to introduce (Sinn). In other words, she argues that Frege’s puzzle is unavoidably question 
begging, so there is nothing to be puzzled about. If this is true, then the purported solutions 
I aimed to discuss here are solutions to a pseudo problem, and there would be no point in 
examining how well they fared in dealing with it. Taschek, on the other hand, claims that 
there is a puzzle all right, but direct reference theorists have completely missed its point. 
The original puzzle, he says, has to do with the nature of logic and its role in our linguistic 
and epistemic life. The solutions these theorists offered, then, do not engage with the real 
issue that needs to be addressed. 
So, in order to be able to assess the plausibility of these striking claims (which, 
if true, would probably render this dissertation pointless), I will first present my own take 
on the original puzzle. After all, how can I examine solutions to a problem without 
knowing clearly what the problem is (if there is a problem), or at least which version of the 
problem was addressed by them? I will not discuss all interpretations that are out there. I 
will only mention them when I see fit. This of course does not mean that I totally disagree 
with them or that my interpretation is completely novel; it only means that, to me, those 
interpretations are not wholly convincing or comprehensive enough, so I will make an 
effort to put together everything I find relevant. 
                                                                                                                                                                                
through referential expressions without realizing we are doing so, and there is often a change in our epistemic 
state when we apprehend certain identity statements and not others. As we will see, Frege’s version of the 
puzzle is somewhat different. However, this puzzle still is a puzzle, and even if it is not exactly what Frege 
had in mind, it must be accounted for. 
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1.2 Frege’s version of Frege’s Puzzle 
The locus classicus of Frege’s presentation of the puzzle is the opening passage 
of Über Sinn und Bedeutung (henceforth SuB): 
Equality gives rise to challenging questions which are not altogether easy to 
answer. Is it a relation? A relation between objects, or between names or signs of 
objects? In my Begriffsschrift I assumed the latter. The reasons which seem to 
favor this are the following: a=a and a=b are obviously statements of differing 
cognitive value (Erkenntniswerte); a=a holds a priori and, according to Kant, is 
to be labelled analytic, while statements of the form a=b often contain very 
valuable extensions of our knowledge and cannot be always established a priori. 
(Frege, 1960a, p. 56) 
The question he asks, then, is how sentences of these two different forms can 
have distinct epistemic profiles if both names flanking the identity sign refer precisely to 
the same object. In other words, Frege wants to know how it is possible for sentences of 
the form a=b (with a and b coreferential) to contain “valuable extensions of our 
knowledge” if they require, in order to be true, the exact same conditions as sentences of 
the form a=a. 
As we can see, Frege’s formulation of the puzzle involves certain notions 
whose precise characterization is not entirely obvious. What exactly are the schemas a=a 
and a=b supposed to represent? What is his conception of analyticity and of a prioricity? 
What does he mean by “valuable extensions of our knowledge” and what is its relation to 
Erkenntniswerte (cognitive value)? Answering those questions and interpreting the passage 
above is a notoriously tricky business, as the many different interpretations available can 
attest. In part, this is Frege’s own fault. His formulation of the puzzle in this passage is 
unfortunate in several ways. It involves, to my view, many unnecessary complications that 
cloud the heart of the matter and that can give rise to mistaken interpretations. If we 
remove at least some of the noise from this passage, we might arrive at a better 
appreciation of what is really at stake. In what follows, I will try to do so. I claim that this 
formulation is infelicitous in mainly three aspects: (1) setting up the puzzle in terms of 
identities; (2) invoking the notions of analyticity and a prioricity; and (3) setting up the 
puzzle in terms of the schemas a=a and a=b without being explicit about what they 
represent. 
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The first and most obvious aspect in which this way of posing the puzzle is 
unfortunate is its formulation in terms of identity statements. As it has now been widely 
recognized (e.g. Salmon (1986), Mendelsohn (2005), Boccardi (2014)), identity statements 
are pretty much inessential to the puzzle. They are just where the problem “happens to 
show its virulence” (Mendelsohn, 2005, p. 30). Frege apparently was not aware of this fact 
when he wrote his Begriffsschrift (henceforth BS), when the puzzle first showed up, but he 
certainly was by the time of SuB.  Evidence of this is that in Funktion und Begriff 
(henceforth FuB), written about a year before SuB, Frege presents the puzzle by means of 
the following sentences, which are evidently not identity statements: 
(a) The Evening Star is a planet with a shorter period of revolution than the 
Earth 
(b) The Morning Star is a planet with a shorter period of revolution than the 
Earth  
Frege notices that the proper names
10
 “the Morning Star” and “the Evening 
Star” contained in those sentences refer to the same heavenly body – Venus – and yet the 
thoughts expressed by (a) and (b) are different, “for somebody who does not know that the 
Morning Star is the Evening Star might regard one as true and the other as false” (Frege, 
1960a, p. 29). He also explicitly claims a bit earlier in the same passage that “from identity 
of reference there does not follow identity of the thought [expressed]” (Frege, 1960a, p. 
29). He then goes on to mention his sense/reference distinction as the explanation of this 
phenomenon, exactly as he does in SuB. This passage from FuB shows that he is perfectly 
aware that substituting coreferential expressions (proper names, for that matter) may affect 
the cognitive value of any sentence that contains them, not only identity statements. 
Overall, this is a far cleaner and less contentious formulation of the puzzle, for 
it involves real sentences, not schemas, and has fewer problematic assumptions than the 
formulation contained in SuB
11. Of course, the notion of “thought” here is far from being 
trivial, but Frege does not need to explain it at this point. To set up the puzzle it is enough 
to appeal to the reader’s intuition regarding the relevant cognitive difference that arises by 
                                                          
10
 In his sense of proper name (Eigenname), which encompasses not only proper names, but also definite 
descriptions. 
11
 However, as Boccardi (2014) notes, this formulation is subject to the same criticism that Glezakos’ (2009) 
put forward against the formulation of SuB, for it also apparently relies on some criterion of name 
individuation. As we will see, her criticism misses the real point of the puzzle. 
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substituting one coreferential expression for the other in sentences (a) and (b). It is quite 
mysterious why he chose a much more complicated manner of presenting the puzzle in 
SuB given that he had a much simpler one at his disposal. 
Whatever his reasons are, the fact is that posing the puzzle only in terms of 
identity statements is more confusing than helpful. The first and obvious problem is that 
this may lead to a mistaken appreciation of the scope of the puzzle. By reading the opening 
paragraph of SuB, we might easily believe that the problem is restricted to identities (as 
Frege himself did in BS) and fail to see that it appears for other types of sentences as well. 
The second problem is that his exposition associates rather obscurely the metaphysical 
problem of identity with the epistemic problem of identity
12
. The metaphysical problem 
concerns the nature of identity relations themselves, while the epistemic problem has to do 
with the epistemic properties of statements expressing those relations. Frege apparently 
means to investigate the epistemic problem by raising the metaphysical one, but he is not 
very clear about how exactly they are related. Moreover, after introducing his distinction 
between sense and reference as a solution to the epistemic problem, he remains silent about 
how it is also supposed to solve the metaphysical one. Because this problem apparently 
was his main motivation for posing the puzzle in SuB, this lack of explanation is quite 
frustrating
13
. In conclusion, then, given that identity is inessential to the puzzle, raising 
metaphysical issues about the identity relation in this context only obscures the matter. 
A second aspect in which the opening paragraph of SuB is unfortunate is in its 
use of the notions of analyticity and a prioricity to characterize the relevant differences 
between sentences of the form a=a and a=b. Frege’s way of putting things easily suggests 
the following (false) opposition: because he first claims that sentences of the form a=a are 
always a priori and analytic and then goes on to contrast them with sentences of the form 
a=b, it is natural to assume that the latter are a posteriori and synthetic (since these are the 
opposite properties of a prioricity and analyticity) and that they express empirical claims. 
This last point is also suggested by the two examples he gives immediately after the quoted 
passage, both drawn from astronomy. Frege also claims that a=b sentences (but not a=a 
                                                          
12
 See Ruffino (2014), p. 36. 
13
 Many different interpretations were offered over the years about how his solution is supposed to apply to 
the metaphysical problem. Thau and Caplan (2001), for instance, even argue for the (very) unorthodox claim 
that Frege never abandoned the metalinguistic view of identity that was first proposed in his BS. See 
Mendelsohn (2005), chap. 4 for a nice survey of the different interpretations of Frege’s change of mind that 
have been proposed.  
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sentences) are capable of extending our knowledge, a property which is most 
straightforwardly attributed to synthetic and a posteriori sentences, not to analytic and a 
priori ones. This reading, however, is way off the mark. 
To be fair with Frege, he does say that the truth of a=b sentences cannot 
always be established a priori, so it follows that their truth can be established a priori at 
least sometimes. This observation clearly undermines the interpretation that a=b sentences 
are a posteriori and express empirical claims. At most, we can conclude that they can be a 
priori or a posteriori, and therefore do not necessarily express empirical claims. The 
examples he gives to illustrate a=b sentences, then, are somewhat infelicitous. If this is the 
case, then it is not very clear what the relevant contrast between a=a and a=b sentences is 
supposed to be. Being not-always-a-priori and not-always-empirical do not tell us much 
about the distinguishing features of a=b sentences, about what really makes them different 
from a=a sentences. 
It seems that the only alternative is to say that the distinguishing feature of a=b 
sentences is that they are synthetic. This would neatly explain their potential, as opposed to 
analytic sentences, for extending our knowledge. After all, synthetic statements are, in their 
most intuitive conception, the ones that add something to our knowledge and not merely 
elaborate on the concepts we already possess. Besides, after Kant, the idea of synthetic a 
priori statements was already on the market, so it would be perfectly plausible to interpret 
Frege as holding that a=b sentences are synthetic, and that some of them can be known a 
priori and some can be known a posteriori. But why does he not explicitly say this in the 
text? Why does he say only that a=a sentences are always analytic, but not that a=b 
sentences are always synthetic, and that for this reason contain “valuable extensions of our 
knowledge”? It certainly would have made things much clearer. 
He does not say that for a very simple reason: a=b sentences are not 
necessarily synthetic either. It is true that Frege’s most famous examples of sentences of 
the form a=b come from the empirical sciences (e.g. his Hesperus and Phosphorus 
example) and from geometry, whose truths, as Kant, Frege thought were synthetic
14
. 
However, and this is important, he believed that some statements from arithmetic can also 
be of the form a=b, where a and b refer to the same number but as resulting from distinct 
                                                          
14
 See Frege (1960a), p. 11, and Frege (1960a), p. 57 for his famous examples from geometry. For the claim 
that geometry deals with synthetic truths, see Frege (1960b), p. 101-2. 
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operations (Ruffino, 2014, p. 36). As it is well known, Frege’s agreement with Kant 
regarding the existence of synthetic a priori truths is restricted to geometry; arithmetic, for 
Frege, is definitely analytic, since it is derived from the laws of logic. It follows, then, that 
some sentences, namely those from arithmetic, can be of the form a=b and be analytic 
nevertheless. 
So, we end up with the following picture: a=a sentences are always analytic 
and a priori, while a=b sentences can have any of the three profiles –analytic and a priori, 
synthetic and a priori, or synthetic and a posteriori. As it seems clear, characterizing the 
two types of sentence forms in terms of these properties does not yield a sharp 
distinguishing criterion for them. Thus, if there is a real and relevant difference between 
sentences of the form a=a and a=b, then there must be some property that one has that the 
other has not, which would explain why a=a sentences are always a priori and analytic 
while a=b sentences are not. What could it be? 
In the quoted passage from SuB, the property that seems to be predicated only 
of a=b sentences, and hence the only one that really seems to distinguish them from a=a 
sentences, is being capable of extending our knowledge, whatever this means exactly. If 
the foregoing discussion is right, this property is not explained in terms of the sentence 
being a posteriori or synthetic, as it could be initially assumed, because analytic and a 
priori sentences can also be of the form a=b and thus are also able to extend our 
knowledge. Hence, Frege must have had something very different in mind about what 
extension of knowledge amounts to. 
All this talk of analyticity and a prioricity in the opening passages of SuB, then, 
is completely dispensable. These notions are obviously not essential to the phenomenon 
that Frege is really interested in and do not mark any relevant difference between a=a and 
a=b sentences. In fact, they are more confusing than clarifying. What really matters for the 
puzzle in SuB is that a=a sentences are never capable of extending our knowledge, while 
a=b sentences are, regardless of them being analytic, synthetic, a priori or a posteriori. 
And, most importantly, a=b sentences extend our knowledge even referring to the same 
object twice and having the same truth conditions as a=a sentences. So, the question that 
Frege wants to answer in SuB, purged of all that irrelevant stuff, becomes this: what is it 
about sentences of the form a=b that makes them capable of extending our knowledge? In 
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what follows, for ease of exposition, I will call the property of extending our knowledge 
informativeness, and its contradictory triviality. 
This brings us to the final and most misleading aspect of Frege’s formulation 
of the puzzle in SuB. Frege poses the puzzle in terms of the schemas a=a and a=b without 
really saying what those schemas are supposed to represent. He gives some examples and 
hopes that we get the point he is making, but unfortunately things are not so transparent. 
Without a clear grasp of what those schemas stand for, then, we cannot understand what he 
means by the property of informativeness and we risk misunderstanding what the puzzle is 
really about. In the next pages, I will present the most obvious interpretation of the 
schemas and show how Glezakos’ criticism applies to it. I will then argue that there is a 
different interpretation that is not subject to her criticisms and which is, to my view, much 
closer to what Frege really had in mind with the puzzle. 
The most obvious reading of the passage in SuB is this. The schemas a=a and 
a=b are abstractions that represent the general form of identity statements, and the symbols 
flanking the identity sign represent names. Hence, a sentence will have the form a=a when 
the same name occurs twice and will have the form a=b when two names occur once. This 
seems to capture the relevant difference between sentences such as “Hesperus is Hesperus” 
and “Hesperus is Phosphorus”, or between “Peter Parker is Peter Parker” and “Peter Parker 
is Spider-Man”: the first sentence of the pairs have only one name occurring twice, and 
hence is of the form a=a, whereas the second sentence of the pairs involves two names, 
and hence is of the form a=b. After all, the names occurring in those sentences are clearly 
syntactically different, a fact that is captured by representing them with different symbols 
in the schemas. It appears obvious, then, that there is a significant difference between 
sentences of the form a=a and a=b: the second is informative while the first is trivial, and 
the puzzle is to explain why this is the case if both have the same truth conditions. 
So far, so good. The problem arises when we consider sentences where 
apparently only one name occurs, and yet there seems to be the same kind of cognitive 
difference that Frege is puzzled about. The most famous example of this situation is 
Kripke’s Pierre. Suppose that Pierre is a fan of the pianist called “Paderewski”. Suppose 
also that he disagrees vehemently with the policies of a certain polish politician called 
“Paderewski”. Unbeknownst to him, they are the same person. It seems that the sentence 
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“Paderewski is Paderewski” is informative to him even though there is only one name 
occurring twice. Or is it? 
This is far from obvious. Should we say that the sentence “Paderewski is 
Paderewski” is of the form a=a or a=b? Is there a single name occurring twice, as it 
seems, or two names? This puts Frege on the horns of a dilemma: either “Paderewski is 
Paderewski” is of the form a=a and thus trivial, contrary to what he believes, or it is of the 
form a=b and informative. Clearly, Frege must grab the second horn of the dilemma in 
order to be something to be puzzled about. But to do so, he must explain why the two 
occurrences of “Paderewski” in that sentence are occurrences of distinct names despite 
being tokens of the same syntactic type, and he must do this without presupposing the very 
notion he is aiming to introduce to solve the puzzle, namely, sense. 
Here is where Glezakos’ criticism comes in. She claims that the only such 
theory neutral criterion available to Frege is contained in his famous footnote B from SuB: 
two occurrences of a name are occurrences of the same name iff they are two tokens of the 
same syntactic type and share the same referent (Glezakos, 2009, p. 204). Under this 
criterion, “Paderewski is Paderewski” would be of the form a=a, since the two occurrences 
of “Paderewski” have the same referent and are clearly two tokens of the same syntactic 
type. However, this sentence would be informative to Pierre despite being of the form a=a, 
as much as any sentence of the form a=b. Thus, there would be no relevant cognitive 
difference between a=a sentences and a=b sentences as Frege assumed. The puzzle is then 
dissolved. 
She also claims that Frege might have proposed another criterion for name 
individuation in Der Gedanke. However, according to her, this criterion necessarily 
presupposes the notion of sense: two occurrences of a name are occurrences of the same 
name iff they have the same sense (Glezakos, 2009, p. 206). Of course, this criterion also 
dissolves the puzzle, for it assumes the very notion that is supposed to solve the puzzle. In 
other words, this way of individuating names is question begging; if we are not already 
attracted to the notion of sense on independent grounds, there is nothing to be puzzled 
about. 
  Hence, under the above interpretation of what the schemas a=a and a=b 
represent in SuB, either the puzzle disappears or it is circular. In either case, we might very 
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well dispense with it. However, I believe that this way of reading the opening passage of 
SuB does not do much justice to Frege and, more importantly, is not necessary. I think 
there is another possible interpretation of what he had in mind with the schemas a=a and 
a=b that avoids Glezakos’ objections and that, to my view, gets closer to the heart of the 
puzzle. In order to present this interpretation, however, it is necessary first to go over some 
important aspects of Frege’s philosophical project.  
Frege’s primary goal was to study thought. Not thought understood as the 
psychological processes of cognition, as mental occurrences which happen in time and in 
some particular brain. He wanted to study thought in an abstract sense, as that “for which 
the question of truth arises” (Frege, 1956, p. 292). Thoughts, for Frege, are the sort of 
things that can be true or false, that are expressed by language and are what we apprehend 
when we think. They are not generated or created by us: we merely grasp them. Thus, 
thoughts in Frege’s sense are objective, immaterial and eternal things which are the bearers 
of truth and falsity and can be apprehended and communicated by different persons at 
different times
15
. 
The discipline that studies thoughts understood in this sense is logic. And the 
goal of logic, Frege claims, is to find what are the most general laws that describe the 
relations and connections between thoughts, in much the same way as physics describes 
the laws of nature and biology describes the laws of life. In other words, Frege believed 
that thoughts are related to each other in such a way that some thoughts follow naturally 
from others, i.e., that thoughts enter into deductive relations with one another following a 
natural order
16
. The task of the logician, then, is precisely to uncover the rules that govern 
this natural ordering, i.e., to describe the deductive relations that thoughts can have with 
each other, thus explaining why some thoughts are logical consequences of others whereas 
others are not. And this can be done regardless of the subject matter at hand: logic 
describes the laws of thought not as applied to this or that specific domain, but of thought 
qua thought, as something which is common to all possible domains. Logic, then, is 
absolutely general. Moreover, in finding the laws that describe the natural ordering of 
thoughts, the logician explains why moving from one thought to another in a chain of 
                                                          
15
 In what follows, I will use the term “thought” only with this loose meaning. It should not be understood as 
the technical notion of “thought” of Frege’s mature thinking, i.e., as the sense (Sinn) of a complete sentence, 
which is already a substantive thesis about its nature. 
16
 Cf. Frege (1960b), p. 23. 
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reasoning is sometimes unwarranted or unjustified: we are justified in moving from one 
thought to the other if and only if this move is in accordance with the most general laws of 
thought. In this sense, then, logic is also a normative discipline, for it sets the standards for 
all rational thinking: it prescribes how we ought to think if we want to think rationally
17
.  
This, however, does not explain the real value of logic, for the same laws apply 
for true thoughts as well as for false thoughts, and nobody is really interested in false 
thoughts. Frege believed that logic is valuable because, in uncovering the laws of thought, 
it also uncovers the laws of truth preservation: if a given thought is true, then all thoughts 
that are appropriately connected with it are also guaranteed to be true. And arriving at 
truths is the goal of all sciences. This is why logic is so important: it lays down the rules 
that must be followed by all sciences if they want to be guaranteed to arrive at truths. 
In this way, then, logic sets up the ultimate grounds of justification for any 
science, and hence for all knowledge. If a given chain of deductive reasoning follows 
precisely the natural ordering of truths, nothing more can be asked of it in terms of 
justification – we are fully justified in believing its conclusion. This is exactly what a proof 
is: a chain of deductive reasoning that lays down, step by step and in conformity with the 
laws of truth, the systematic transition from the thoughts that constitute the premises to the 
thought that constitutes the conclusion. In other terms, a proof is something that “reveals 
the logical self-evidence of its conclusion” (Dickie, 2008, p. 275, emphasis mine) by 
showing its relation to the premises in logically self-evident steps, which is the same to say 
that they follow the natural order of truths
18
. 
It is also important to stress that Frege believed that thoughts are structured, 
i.e., that they are build out of simpler parts that refer
19
 to or are about objects and 
properties, and they obey a certain mode of combination. These parts, of course, can 
appear in any number of thoughts, combined in different ways. Different thoughts, then, 
may have parts in common. Moreover, every thought component (whatever they are) has 
what I will call, following Dickie (2008), inferential properties, i.e., properties that affect 
how the thoughts they are components of relate to other thoughts. In different terms, every 
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 See McFarlane (2002) for a discussion of Frege’s conception of logic as a descriptive and normative 
discipline. See also Frege (1997), pp. 227-250.  
18
 This point is very well explained by Dickie (2008). See also Frege (1960b), p. 102 for his discussion of 
proofs and of logical self-evidence. 
19
 I am using the term “refer” here in a very loose sense, meaning only that these thought parts are about 
things in the world. 
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relevant thought component, whether it refers to objects or properties, has certain 
properties that explain why the thoughts that contain them lie where they lie in the natural 
order of thoughts. So, one thought follows naturally from the other because their 
components have suitably related inferential properties. The inferential properties of 
thought components, then, determine the inferential properties of complete thoughts, i.e., 
which inferences are authorized or warranted, and are what explains the transmission of 
truth from the premises to the conclusion in a deductive reasoning. Hence, to study 
thoughts and the laws that govern them, the logician must study their structure and their 
parts, and explain how they have the inferential properties they have. Only in doing so she 
can account for how some thoughts may be legitimately inferred from others whereas some 
may not. 
But how, after all, can she study thoughts? They are immaterial and abstract 
things which cannot be put under a microscope for inspection. Frege expressed this 
concern in a footnote of Der Gedanke: 
I am not in the happy position here of a mineralogist who shows his hearers a 
mountain crystal. I cannot put a thought in the hands of my readers with the 
request that they should minutely examine it from all sides. I have to content 
myself with presenting the reader with a thought, in itself immaterial, dressed in 
sensible linguistic form. (…) So a battle with language takes place and I am 
compelled to occupy myself with language although is not my proper concern 
here. (Frege, 1956, p. 298, footnote 1) 
Now we can understand why Frege was interested in language. His primary 
interest was in thoughts and their laws, but thoughts are not immediately accessible. The 
only way to access them and inspect their properties is through their linguistic 
embodiment. But how can Frege be so sure that language is so safe a guide to thought? As 
said earlier, thoughts are structured entities that are expressed through language. If 
thoughts are indeed structured and can be expressed in language, then language must also 
be structured, at least to a certain degree. As Frege puts it,  
even a thought grasped by a human being for the very first time can be put into a 
form of words which will be understood by someone to whom the thought is 
entirely new. This would be impossible, were we not able to distinguish parts in 
the thought corresponding to the parts of a sentence, so that the structure of the 
sentence serves as an image of the structure of the thought. (Frege, 1963, p. 1) 
As we can see, Frege’s interest in language is only derivative. He is concerned 
with language only as a means to study thought and its laws. If the structure of language 
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mirrors the structure of thought – at least to some degree – then the logician can investigate 
language to achieve his goal. However, natural language is too messy a medium for the 
expression of thought. Of course, its function is to express and communicate thoughts, but 
it is so filled with impurities and complications that figuring out which thought is being 
expressed in a given occasion requires a great level of skill and ingenuity. Natural 
language, then, is “an imperfect vehicle for thought” (Burge, 2005, p. 246), as it does not 
reveal in a precise way the relevant structure of thoughts and their relations. In fact, Frege 
thinks that logic is necessary precisely because natural language is ill suited for expressing 
thoughts accurately. If the logician really wants to study thought in the most fruitful 
manner, she must remove all the impurities from natural language, in the same way that the 
scientist isolates her experiment from all outside interference. The best way to do this, 
Frege held, is to create a new language that is “ideally suited to the expression of thought” 
(Burge, 2005, p. 245), one that captures only its relevant structure and is able to precisely 
represent its components and their inferential properties. Moreover, such a language would 
be extremely useful for other scientific disciplines as well, because it would be much better 
suited for expressing their discoveries and their justification than natural language is. And 
developing this ideal language is exactly what Frege did in his Begriffsschrift. 
Before talking about this ideal language, however, let us take stock. Frege 
believed that thoughts are related to each other in such a way that some thoughts follow 
naturally from others. They form a natural order of thoughts, and the job of the logician is 
to describe the laws of this natural ordering. Uncovering these laws is important because it 
prescribes how we ought to construct proofs, which are the ultimate justification for all 
knowledge. Something is a proof if and only if there are no gaps or intermediate implicit 
thoughts in its chain of reasoning, i.e., if it represents correctly the natural order of the 
thoughts in question. Thoughts are structured entities which are composed of more 
elementary parts that are about things in the world, and these parts have properties that 
determine where the thoughts that contain them lie in the natural order of thoughts. So, to 
study thought appropriately, the logician has to study their parts and how they relate to 
each other. Since the structure of language mirrors the structure of thought, then the best 
way to study thoughts is to devise a perfect language that captures precisely the structure 
of the thoughts it expresses. 
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The language of the BS has many interesting aspects, but only one (which I 
think is often overlooked) will prove crucial for understanding the opening passage of SuB. 
This aspect has to do with the relation between syntactical form and logical form in this 
language. As I mentioned, the purpose of the BS was to devise a language that was able to 
express thoughts and their logical structure clearly and without any ambiguity. Hence, 
contrary to natural language sentences, no question of which though is being expressed 
would arise for sentences in the perfect language, and its logical structure would be 
immediately apparent. Since what matters for logic are the inferential properties of 
thoughts and thought components, this language is better be able to represent their proper 
distinctions. The best way to guarantee that this occurs is to stipulate that, in this language, 
to every syntactical difference must correspond a logical difference. In other terms, in the 
language of the BS, syntactic representations must always reflect a difference in inferential 
properties of what is being represented. Hence, in the perfect language, syntactical form 
and logical form always coincide. 
Frege makes the point above about syntactical form because, as he says in SuB, 
“nobody can be forbidden to use any arbitrarily producible event or object as a sign for 
something” (Frege, 1960a, p. 57). This means that someone can arbitrarily choose to 
represent the same thought or thought component with as many different syntactic 
representations as she likes. For example, I may very well arbitrarily choose to represent 
the same thought component with the shapes a, b, c and d. These shapes, however, do not 
represent a logically relevant difference according to Frege; the shapes a, b, c and d would 
be mere notational variants of the same logically relevant content, in the same way as the 
words “color” and “colour” are notational variants of the same concept. The inferential 
properties of what they represent are identical. As it seems clear, such distinction serves no 
purpose in the BS. If we want a language that is able to display without ambiguity the 
logical structure of thoughts, having extra syntactic representations to express the same 
thought or thought component would only complicate things. In fact, excess of syntactic 
representations is one of the things that make natural language ill-suited for the accurate 
expression of thought. For this reason, Frege posits a normative constraint on syntactic 
representations for the ideal language: different orthographic shapes (such as a and b) must 
represent different logically relevant contents, so that a syntactic difference always reflects 
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a logical difference in the thought components they express. Hence, syntax is at the service 
of logic. 
This is precisely what we must have in mind when we read the first paragraph 
of SuB. When Frege talks about statements of the form a=a and a=b, he is not assuming 
anything about the syntactical or logical form of actual proper names and sentences of 
natural language, and claiming that sentences of these forms have different cognitive 
profiles. If this was the case, Frege would of course need to provide a criterion for name 
individuation to determine when a given sentence of natural language is of the form a=a or 
a=b, as Glezakos points out. Rather, he has in mind sentences of these forms in his ideal 
language, where thoughts and their logically relevant structure are clearly and 
unambiguously expressed by the syntactical representations of that language
20
.  
So, when he says that sentences of the form a=a and a=b have different 
cognitive values, he really means that thoughts of the form a=a and a=b have different 
cognitive values: the first represents a trivial or tautological self-identity, whereas the 
second represents an informative one. And that there are such identity thoughts seems 
clear enough: I can certainly think twice about the same object and know beyond doubt 
that I did so, and at some point of my cognitive life I certainly was informed by coming to 
know that what I regarded as distinct objects were in fact the same object. The mere 
existence of this phenomenon is enough to generate the puzzle for Frege. It does not matter 
at all which actual, existing sentences of natural language express thoughts of these forms 
and under which circumstances, or even if any of them do; we can very well stipulate in an 
ideal language which sentences and symbols represent precisely the identity thoughts in 
question. Thus, Frege does not need to answer if the actual sentence “Paderewski is 
Paderewski” is of the form a=a or a=b to be able pose his puzzle, or any sentence of 
natural language for that matter; in his ideal language this question simply does not arise, 
for the syntactical form of a sentence always reflects the logical form of the thought 
expressed by it. 
If we interpret the schemas a=a and a=b in this way, then what Frege had in 
mind with the puzzle in SuB becomes much clearer. It goes like this: why are there 
significant logical differences between two thoughts that require identical conditions to 
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obtain in order to be true? Why two thoughts that are about the same objects and the same 
properties can nevertheless differ in their inferential properties? In other words, why are 
we justified in deducing set S of inferences from one thought while at the same time not 
justified in deducing set S from the other, if they are extensionally equivalent? Why do 
they occupy different places in the natural order of thoughts? In its core, then, Frege’s 
puzzle has little to do with language. It does not arise by first considering natural language 
sentences and then asking why these sentences differ in their cognitive profile; the puzzle 
arises for Frege because some thoughts with coreferring parts can have distinct inferential 
properties, and this fact about thought is completely independent of there being actual 
natural language sentences that express it. Language comes into play only because there is 
no way to study thought and its laws other than by clothing it in linguistic form. In order to 
talk about the puzzle, we must put it down in symbols, but we do not need to borrow 
natural language sentences to do it. We can now see that Glezakos’ criticism, which reads 
Frege as claiming something about the syntactical and logical form of natural language 
sentences, is not a threat to the puzzle posed this way. It simply misses its target. 
To sum up. We saw that the puzzle does not arise only for identities, that it has 
nothing to do with analyticity or a prioricity, and that we should not interpret the schemas 
a=a and a=b in the opening passage of SuB as representing natural language sentences but 
as representing forms of thought. If we have this in mind, and if we understand Frege’s 
general views on the connection between thought, logic and justification, then we can 
appreciate what exactly Frege is puzzled about. In any case, it seems clear that natural 
language was not his concern, and so he made no assumptions about actual sentence forms. 
What Frege needs to assume to pose the puzzle in SuB, of course, is that 
coreferential thoughts may differ in a logically significant manner, and that “cognitive 
value” (Erkenntniswerte) is a logical property. But this is precisely what he assumes21. Put 
another way, what is implicit in his formulation of the puzzle is that extensionally 
equivalent thoughts and thought components can have significant cognitive differences – 
what he calls cognitive value – and that these cognitive differences must be accounted for 
by logic. And this is a very reasonable assumption to make, given his views on thought and 
on what logic is about. Consider, for example, a perfectly rational subject who has two 
thoughts that can be expressed in an ideal language as Fa and Gb, where F and G represent 
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thought components that are about properties, and a and b represent thought components 
that are about objects. This subject does not know that a and b corefer, so there is a 
cognitive difference between thoughts Fa and Gb. Even if she is ideally rational, she would 
not be able to infer that (F∧G)a or (F∧G)b without discovering that a=b, even though 
these thoughts are all true. Of course, nothing prevents the subject from moving from the 
thought that Fa or Gb to the other conjunctive thoughts for whatever psychological 
reasons; the point is that she would not be able to do so justifiably and rationally. In other 
terms, since the subject is ideally rational and cannot tell at the outset that a and b are 
about the same object, it must be the case that a and b have different inferential properties, 
so moving from one thought to the other would not follow the natural order of thoughts, 
and hence the move would not be justified. Moreover, as Frege says in FuB, a rational 
subject may regard one thought as true while the other false, due to no fault of her own. It 
seems quite natural to think that this sort of cognitive difference arises because the relevant 
thoughts have different logical properties, and this is precisely what Frege believed. 
The same example can be put in terms of a simple proof (with the proper rules 
of inference): 
i. Fa 
ii. Gb 
iii. a=b 
iv. Fb 
v. Ga 
vi. Fb ∧ Ga 
If we remove step (iii), we would no longer be justified in believing the 
thoughts expressed in (iv), (v) and (vi), for removing it would transform a chain of 
reasoning that is built out only of logically self-evident steps into one that is not. Hence, 
this chain of reasoning would no longer be a proof: there is a logical gap between steps (ii) 
and (iv) that prevent it from being self-evident, despite the fact that all thoughts contained 
in that purported proof are true
22
. If this is the case, then it seems clear that the thought 
components represented by a and b have distinct logical properties even though they are 
about the same object. The proof would likewise be flawed if, instead of using the sentence 
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a=b in step (iii), we used the sentence a=a. Sentence a=a tells us nothing we do not 
already know. The thought it expresses is trivial, and thus is not connected to the other 
thoughts contained in the purported proof in a suitable way as to render its conclusion self-
evident. In sum, then, the above examples seem to show that the cognitive difference 
between a=a and a=b, and between a and b, are logical differences. 
Now we can also understand what Frege really means by the mysterious 
property of extending our knowledge (or informativeness) that he attributed only to a=b 
sentences as opposed to a=a sentences. Sentences of the form a=b, but not sentences of 
the form a=a, can render an otherwise ‘gappy’ and not self-evident chain of reasoning into 
one that is self-evident, thus justifying us in believing the conclusion. By coming to learn 
that a=b, then, a rational subject can draw inferences that she could not (or was not 
warranted) before. She can come to see new connections and relations between thoughts 
that she already believed, and thus might correct (metaphysically) inconsistent beliefs in 
her belief system that could not be corrected before. Suppose, for example, that our subject 
believes (correctly) that Fa and Gb, and believes (incorrectly) that ~Ga and ~Fb, and she 
does not know that a and b are coreferential. She is not able to tell, by logic alone, that she 
has inconsistent beliefs. By coming to learn that a=b, however, she might immediately 
perceive this inconsistency, even though she already believed that a=a and b=b. Sentences 
of the form a=b, then, may cause a reorganization of our beliefs and our knowledge that 
sentences of the form a=a cannot, precisely by revealing connections that were not 
knowable in advance. And the revealing of new connections and relations between 
thoughts is precisely what Frege means by extension of knowledge
23
, even if nothing 
essentially new emerges in this process (Frege, 1960b, p. 100). This is why even analytic 
and a priori sentences can be informative if they are of the form a=b: they may reveal 
connections between thoughts expressed by other analytic sentences that were otherwise 
not self-evident, even if they do not contain any essentially new (synthetic) information in 
themselves
24
. 
It seems very plausible, then, to assume that the sort of cognitive differences 
that Frege detected between coreferential thought components or between trivial and 
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informative self-identities are logical differences. If the activity of rational thinking is the 
activity of taking possession of thoughts and trying to follow their natural order, as Frege 
believed, and if an ideally rational subject is simply not able to draw a certain inference 
from a given set of coreferential thoughts, then her inability to do so must be due to a 
logical difference in those thoughts and their components. Their inferential properties are 
simply not suitably related as to reveal the transition from the premises to the conclusion. 
Even if she does move from the premises to the conclusion with a ‘gappy’ reasoning, she 
would not be justified in doing so, because this move does not follow the natural order of 
thoughts. Frege’s view of rationality, then, is inextricably connected to logic and 
justification, and Frege’s puzzle lies exactly at the intersection of these issues. 
This is why solving this puzzle is so important for Frege. He knows (or 
reasonably assumes) that there are logical differences between coreferential thoughts, but 
we do not know why these differences arise. In other terms, he does not know why 
extensionally equivalent thoughts can have distinct cognitive values. Without a proper 
account of why this is the case, the logician cannot offer a complete account of thought, its 
laws and their relation to rationality and justification. It is not enough to describe the laws 
that govern the transitions from one thought to the other. She must also give an account of 
what endows thoughts with the inferential properties they have, i.e., what makes them have 
the logical forms they have. Put another way, she must explain what our reasoning is 
sensitive to, and hence explain why coreferential thoughts may differ in cognitive value. 
Only in doing so she will be able to offer a complete account of what constitutes a proper 
proof and hence of what is a proper justification for scientific knowledge. 
When the puzzle first appeared, in BS, Frege had inconsistent views on this 
matter. On the one hand, Frege apparently believed that what was responsible for 
endowing thoughts (and their components) with the inferential properties they have were 
only the relevant circumstances (Umstände) whose obtaining or not obtaining made them 
true of false (Taschek, 1992, pp 769-770). In other words, he believed that what 
determined the relevant inferential properties of thoughts were simply their referential truth 
conditions
25
. Moreover, he apparently held that what was relevant for determining the 
inferential properties of the part of a thought that is about an object was the object itself: if 
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two thought components are coreferential, then they have the same inferential properties, 
i.e., they are logically identical. Hence, two thoughts with the same referential truth 
conditions would be identical for the purposes of the BS: they would occupy the same 
place in the natural order of thoughts and could be indifferently interchanged in a proof. In 
this aspect, Frege’s position is very Millian in spirit, for the bearers of logical properties in 
the BS seem very much like singular propositions, which have objects themselves as 
ingredients. I will call this “the referential view” of inferential properties. 
On the other hand, Frege already had the intuition that our reasoning is not 
sensitive only to the referential truth conditions of our thoughts, but also to the modes of 
determination (Bestimmungweisen)
26
 of these truth conditions; more specifically, to the 
modes of determination of the relevant objects. Frege explicitly claims that “we must 
supply, corresponding to the two ways of determination, two different names for the thing 
thus determined” (Frege, 1960a, p. 12-3, emphasis mine). As I mentioned earlier, one of 
the important aspects of the ideal language is that, to avoid ambiguity, there must be a one 
to one correspondence between syntactic representations and logically relevant contents. 
When Frege says that we must use different names when an object is determined in 
different ways, it is seems clear that he is under the impression that modes of determination 
are responsible for endowing thoughts and their parts with their inferential properties, and 
hence we should represent this fact in the ideal language by supplying distinct names for 
the same object. As he says, giving different names to the same object is “not always just a 
trivial matter of formulation; if they go along with different ways of determining the 
content, they are essential to the nature of the case” (Frege, 1960a, p. 12). In fact, he even 
says a bit earlier that we are not justified in using the same name for an object determined 
in different ways; only a proof that reveals their equivalence could authorize us to do so. 
These claims would make no sense if he did not already had at least the intuition that what 
is relevant for thought and its logical properties were not the objects it is about, but their 
modes of determination. I will call this “the mode of determination view” of inferential 
properties. 
This is why an identity sign cannot be thrown away in a perfect language. On 
the referential view, if two terms a and b are coreferential, then they have the same 
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inferential properties, and hence could be interchanged in a proof or in any chain of 
reasoning without compromising the logical self-evidence of its steps. They have, as Frege 
would later put it, the same cognitive value. Thus, there would be no logical difference 
whatsoever between sentences of the form a=a and a=b, and the identity sign would be 
completely dispensable. But Frege is eager to show that this is mistaken. He says that, as 
soon as the terms a and b are joined by an identity sign, they “appear in propria persona” 
(Frege, 1960a, p. 10), and thus represent themselves in the statement. The sentence a=b, 
then, expresses something like “the name ‘a’ has the same content as the name ‘b’”. And 
this is not something irrelevant, for, as we saw, names in an ideal language go along with 
different ways of determining the content, and hence identity statements are able to express 
significant knowledge about objects. 
Clearly, the referential view and the mode of determination view are 
incompatible. Either our reasoning is sensitive to the referential truth conditions of the 
thoughts we grasp – and is therefore sensitive only to their referents – or it is sensitive to 
their mode of determination. It cannot be both. If a and b are coreferential, they should 
have the same inferential properties according to the referential view; it should not matter 
if they are determined in different ways. We could use either one in a proof and the proof 
would still be logically self-evident. According to the mode of determination view, 
however, it does not matter if a and b corefer; if they are determined differently, then their 
inferential properties also differ. Hence, we cannot substitute one term for the other in a 
proof without rendering it not self-evident. One of these views must be given up. 
Frege probably failed to see the incompatibility in his BS views because he 
thought that modes of determination were important only in the context of identity 
statements, and he managed to deal with the problem with his metalinguistic solution. He 
did not see that substituting one term for the other could change the inferential properties 
of any sentence, not only of identity statements, and could thus invalidate otherwise self-
evident proofs. By the time of SuB, however, Frege came to realize that the puzzle is 
general, and so the referential view must be abandoned. He realized that what it is really 
relevant for endowing thoughts with their inferential properties are the modes of 
determination of the objects we think about, not the objects themselves. In other words, he 
recognized that objects are not sufficient to determine the logical properties of thoughts 
that are about them. So, in order to construct adequate, logically self-evident proofs which 
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follow the natural order of thoughts, we must pay attention to the mode of determination of 
objects, and not only to the objects themselves. We must distinguish between the 
Bedeutung, which is the extension of thoughts and their parts, and the Sinn, which is the 
stuff that thoughts themselves are made of, and wherein the mode of determination is 
contained. It is the Sinn that explains why two extensionally equivalent thoughts can 
nevertheless differ in their inferential properties. It is the Sinn that determines where a 
given thought lies in the natural order of thoughts, not its Bedeutung, and therefore it is the 
Sinn that must be represented in a proper proof. 
To summarize: Frege detected a cognitive difference between coreferential (or 
extensionally equivalent) thoughts, and believed that this difference can only be a logical 
difference. The question he sets himself to answer is why this logical difference arises. In 
the BS, he had conflicting intuitions on this regard; by the time of SuB, however, he was 
clearly aware that objects themselves cannot determine the inferential properties of 
thoughts that are about them. In other terms, the Bedeutung was not sufficient for logic and 
for explaining cognitive value. He needed the Sinn, and modes of determination, to explain 
why this logical difference between coreferential thoughts arises. 
1.3 Are the puzzles different after all? 
As we can see from the foregoing discussion, Frege’s version of the puzzle 
seems considerably different than the problem that traditionally goes under the name of 
“Frege’s Puzzle”, which was described in section 1. If this interpretation of Frege is 
correct, he saw the puzzle as essentially a logical problem about thoughts and their relation 
to proof theory and rationality, with nothing to do with actual natural language sentences 
(or utterances) and their impacts in the cognitive life of speakers. But are the two versions 
really so different? 
It seems to me that they are not. Both versions deal with the same general 
phenomena – i.e., the phenomenon of trivial and informative self-identities, and the 
phenomenon of differing cognitive values of extensionally equivalent thoughts (understood 
in a very loose manner) – but from different perspectives. Frege was not really interested in 
natural language; more precisely, he was interested in language only insofar as language 
can help understanding thought and its logical properties. Natural language, for him, then, 
occupied an extremely marginal place in his philosophical project. He never really cared 
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about working out the details of how the problematic thoughts he was concerned with were 
actually expressed in natural language. He also assumed that the phenomena of cognitive 
value were fundamentally logical phenomena, i.e., that they should be accounted for by the 
science of logic. Because of this assumption, he placed the puzzle at the center of his 
broader philosophical project of devising a perfect language in which we could adequately 
carry out proofs, and hence provide the ultimate grounds of justification for scientific 
knowledge. Hence, given Frege’s background assumptions, the general puzzle assumed a 
much more specific form and a much more specific role in Frege’s philosophical endeavor. 
 The puzzle as presented in section 1 involves the same phenomena of 
cognitive value that Frege recognized, but it takes natural language as its starting point. To 
pose that version of the puzzle, the one which is traditionally labeled “Frege’s Puzzle”, we 
do not need to assume any substantial thesis about logic, rationality and justification of 
scientific knowledge as Frege did. We need only to (a) recognize that the phenomena of 
triviality, informativeness and cognitive value of thought (understood broadly) do exist, 
and (b) ask ourselves when and how these phenomena can be manifested in natural 
language. In other words, we just need to acknowledge the existence of such phenomena 
and acknowledge that natural language can, at least sometimes, exhibit them
27
. We can 
then set ourselves to the task of explaining why this is the case, independently of any prior 
assumptions about logic, semantics, or whatever. For it seems quite evident that natural 
language can, in fact, manifest these phenomena: at some point of our lives we certainly 
apprehended an informative identity statement, and we can easily think of situations where 
natural language sentences can be used to express trivial self-identities. To engage with 
this puzzle is to explain under what circumstances this is possible, and why. And a great 
variety of explanations have been proposed. 
In sum, then, both the general puzzle from section 1 and Frege’s version of the 
puzzle deal essentially with the same general phenomena about thought and cognitive 
value. The difference lies in their background assumptions and in their starting point, and 
what they think that cognitive value is. This finally brings us to Taschek’s criticism of 
direct reference theorists and their approach to the puzzle. 
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Taschek’s criticism of direct reference has to do with the issues about 
inferential properties of thoughts and referential truth conditions I mentioned earlier. He 
also interprets Frege more or less along the lines of what I have presented here, and claims 
that the real challenge of Frege’s puzzle is precisely to “account for the way in which the 
logical properties of the contents [i.e., thoughts] of our sentences can outstrip their 
referential truth conditions” (Taschek, 1992, p. 788). And Frege met this challenge by 
rejecting the referential view and accepting the mode of determination view of inferential 
properties. According to Taschek, even if Frege’s theory of Sinn and Bedeutung is 
ultimately flawed, it is certainly in keeping with our most intuitive view on the role that 
logic has in our cognitive and linguistic practices and in the way we intuitively evaluate 
beliefs in terms of their implications, their consistency, etc. As I said earlier, it seems very 
plausible to assume that, if an ideally rational subject cannot draw some inference or does 
not realize that she has inconsistent beliefs due to no fault of her own, then it must be the 
case that her beliefs differ in a logically significant manner: her beliefs may be 
metaphysically inconsistent, but not logically inconsistent. We cannot explain this fact by 
resorting only to their referential truth conditions, and Frege noticed this. In sum, then, 
Taschek believes that Frege is right in associating logic and rationality the way he does. 
Direct reference theorists, on the other hand, reject this association without 
providing sufficient arguments, according to Taschek. They deny, even if implicitly, that 
rationality implies logical consistency. For them, what is relevant for determining the 
logical properties of the contents of our beliefs is just their referential truth conditions. In 
other words, direct reference theorists hold a referentialist view of inferential properties, 
which is precisely the view that Frege saw the need to eschew when he faced the puzzle in 
SuB. On direct reference, then, a subject that is ideally rational can nevertheless have 
logically inconsistent beliefs, as is illustrated by poor Pierre: he does believe a 
contradiction when he believes what is expressed by the sentences “London is not pretty” 
and “Londres est jolie”. Yet, he is not irrational. If it is possible for a rational subject to 
indeed believe a contradiction, then direct reference urgently owes us an adequate account 
of the role that logic plays vis-à-vis rationality and vis-à-vis our ordinary evaluations of 
consistency and implication in a subject’s system of beliefs. As Taschek puts it, 
The real issue, then, between Frege and the Russellian [direct reference theorist] 
has nothing to do with questions of sameness or difference of information 
content, but (…) with much more profound issues about the nature and subject 
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matter of logic, and, in particular, with how best to understand the normative 
control logic has on our cognitive and linguistic practice. Adequately accounting 
for this is exactly the challenge that Frege took himself to be responding to when 
he introduced his theory of sense; this is the challenge that he took his puzzle to 
pose. If I am right, the Russellian has not so much as engaged with this 
challenge, let alone met it. (Taschek, 1992, p. 791-2) 
 
 In other words, Taschek thinks that it is not enough to brandish singular 
propositions against Frege; they may very well refute traditional Fregean semantics, but to 
really engage with his puzzle, direct reference theorists must occupy themselves with 
deeper issues about rationality and logical consequence
28
. The solutions they offered to the 
puzzle presuppose substantive theses about these questions, yet they are far from being 
clearly articulated and well defended. Direct reference theorists, then, may have dealt with 
one aspect of Frege’s puzzle, but failed to tackle what really needs to be tackled. But is this 
criticism of direct reference appropriate? 
Yes and no. It is appropriate in the sense that major direct reference theorists, 
such as Kaplan and Perry, as far as I am aware, never interpreted Frege’s puzzle precisely 
in this manner, and because of this they never systematically addressed these issues 
directly in connection to the puzzle. They faced it mainly on semantic grounds. However, 
there is a vast literature on the subject of content externalism, rationality and logical 
consequence. If the moral of Frege’s puzzle is really about rationality, logic and its 
normative constraints in our actual reasoning, then it seems clear that the problem is being 
discussed appropriately, even if it is not directly associated to the puzzle itself. However, I 
believe that, even if direct reference theorists did not engage with Frege’s version of the 
puzzle, they have clearly engaged with the general puzzle I presented in section 1, which 
as we saw are not so different after all. Their focus is natural language, and their broad 
philosophical projects are very different than Frege’s. For this reason, they cannot be 
blamed if they did not occupy themselves with precisely the same issues which Frege 
believed were so pressing. Of course, a complete account of the puzzle and of all its 
aspects and implications for thought and language must at some point tell us where logic 
fits in, and what role it plays. But I believe that logic is by no means the only relevant 
aspect of the puzzle, and is not the most important. It certainly was for Frege given his 
background assumptions, but it does not need to be for us who are mainly interested in 
                                                          
28
 Taschek’s criticism is, in some aspects, very similar to Boghossian’s (1992) criticism of content 
externalism. 
44 
 
natural language. In a word, we do not need to assume that “cognitive value” is a logical 
notion, as Frege did. 
1.4 Concluding remarks 
The puzzle for Frege and the puzzle that has been attributed to him are 
somewhat different, but they are based on the same interesting phenomena of cognitive 
value and thought (understood in a broad sense). In any case, even if Frege’s version of the 
puzzle has some distinctive particularities, Frege has been widely interpreted as setting an 
adequacy criterion for semantic theories, namely, that semantic theories must account for 
the phenomena of cognitive value. Even philosophers who abandoned Fregean semantics, 
such as Perry and Kaplan, believed that this adequacy criterion is correct. They believed 
that cognitive value is an aspect of meaning, so they tried to account for it on semantic 
grounds. In what follows, I will argue that their attempts to do so fail, and that this gives us 
very good reasons to suspect that cognitive value is not an aspect of meaning. From now 
on, all mentions of the puzzle will refer to the puzzle as arising for natural language, the 
one that direct reference clearly engaged with, not to Frege’s more particular version. 
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2. Indexicals. 
As I mentioned in the first chapter, Frege’s Puzzle does not arise only for 
sentences involving proper names. It also appears in sentences involving indexicals. As we 
will see, indexicals are the most appealing starting point for the direct reference theorist 
who is sympathetic to the Fregean approach to semantics. In this chapter, I will explain 
how Frege’s Puzzle arises for indexicals and why the solution via character and via 
reflexive content do not work, even in more sophisticated forms. To do that, I will first 
explain what indexicals are and present the Kaplanian semantics, which is the orthodox 
theory of indexicals. In order to deal with some naïve objections that can be posed to 
Kaplan’s solution to the puzzle, I will first present his theory in a somewhat simplified 
form (as Wettstein (1986) apparently understood it), and then in its strongest version. After 
dealing with the solution via character, I will explain what reflexive content is and argue 
that it also suffers from the same problems as a modified version of the character. 
2.1 Pure indexicals and demonstratives 
Indexicals are linguistic expressions that have different semantic values 
depending on the context of their utterance. The clearest cases of indexical words are 
words like “I”, “you”, “me”, “here”, “now”, “this”, “that”: depending on the occasion of 
their use, they refer or designate different things. For example, I might utter the sentence 
“it is raining here” in Campinas and Kim Jong-un might utter “it is raining here” in 
Pyongyang. We say different things (I may utter a falsity while Kim Jong-un utters a truth) 
by using the same sentence. The explanation for this phenomenon is that the referent of the 
word “here” depends on the context of its use. When I utter “here”, I am referring to 
Campinas, and when Kim Jong-un utters “here”, he refers to Pyongyang. The same 
sentence is used to express different propositions. The same phenomenon occurs with all 
other indexical words. We call this feature context sensitivity. Many other words exhibit 
some kind of indexicality, like “foreigner” or “neighbor”29, but they do not concern me 
here. I focus only on the most emblematic examples of indexicals, which were the most 
extensively discussed in the context of Frege’s Puzzle. 
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The first important thing to notice is that indexicals are not a monolithic 
semantic category. Kaplan (1989a) distinguished between pure indexicals and 
demonstratives
30
. Pure indexicals are words like “I”, “here”, “now”, “today” and 
“yesterday”. They are indexicals that do not require an accompanying gesture or pointing 
in order to secure a referent in the context. This means that when I utter an indexical of this 
sort I do not need to perform any kind of demonstration in order to determine a referent in 
the context. When I say “today is a horrible day”, I am not required to point nor do any 
kind of gesture to indicate to which day I am referring. It is clear that the mere utterance of 
the word “today” in the context is enough to determine the day in question. The same thing 
happens with “I”. I do not need to point at myself in order to convey which object I am 
referring to. Simply by hearing (or reading) me saying “I” is sufficient for the hearer to 
know that I intend to refer to myself. Of course, an utterance of “I” may be accompanied 
by some gesture, like when I angrily say “I was the one who did it!” while repeatedly 
pointing at my chest. However, this pointing is merely a resource for emphasis, not a 
necessary device for determining the referent. What I said would be equally understood 
even if I had my hands tied to a chair. Any demonstration accompanying a pure indexical, 
therefore, is “either for emphasis or irrelevant” (Kaplan, 1989a, p. 491). 
On the other hand, demonstratives are not capable of securing a referent by 
themselves. They are words like “this”, “that”, “he”, “she” and “there”, that require some 
sort of demonstration in order to determine a referent in a context
31
. Imagine a situation in 
which I am walking down the street with a friend and we spot three little boys coming 
toward us. I recognize one of them as my most annoying neighbor. I then turn to my friend 
and say “he is a little monster” without any pointing or gesture whatsoever. It seems 
obvious that my friend would be at a loss to know to which boy I am referring. The word 
“he” by itself does not do any discriminating job in this context: there are three boys to 
which I may be referring, and none of them is particularly salient. In order to specify for 
the audience which boy I have in mind, I have to point at him (or tilt my head to be more 
discrete) in addition to uttering the indexical “he”. It is the same with all other 
demonstratives. An utterance of “that” or “this” without any demonstration will be, as 
Kaplan puts it, incomplete, for the words by themselves are incapable of securing a 
                                                          
30
 Most philosophers accept such distinction. The only apparent exception that I am aware of is Salmon 
(2002). He believes that pure indexicals and demonstratives are both complete in the relevant sense, so no 
significant distinction is warranted, at least not at the level of meaning.  
31
 I am not considering cases of anaphora or bound variables, just the demonstrative uses of these words. 
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referent, i.e., distinguishing one object from others in the context. In summary, 
demonstratives are the type of indexical that requires an accompanying demonstration in 
order to refer successfully, while pure indexicals can do this by themselves. 
 It is important to stress that the notion of “accompanying demonstration” is 
not restricted to actions performed by the speaker. Kaplan (1989a) believes that any sort of 
feature of the context that makes an object sufficiently salient is enough to count as a 
demonstration. Consider the situation described above, but where my annoying neighbor is 
singing very loudly and drawing a lot of attention. If I say “he is a little monster” without 
any gesture, my friend would be able to recognize the referent of “he”. There is a feature of 
the context (the boy’s singing) that makes the referent appropriately salient. I, as a 
competent speaker, can exploit this fact to refer to him without performing any 
discriminating gesture. As Kaplan himself says, his notion of a demonstration is “a 
theoretical concept” (Kaplan, 1989a, p. 490 footnote 9)32. In any case, we may for now 
leave open the question of what exactly constitutes a demonstration. 
2.2 Character and content 
In Kaplan’s theory, indexicals have two types of meaning. One is what he 
called the character of the indexical, and the other is its content. The distinction between 
these two types of meaning is fairly intuitive. As we saw, the referent of an indexical shifts 
from context to context (more precisely, its semantic value). However, it seems evident 
that despite this shift of semantic value there is something that remains stable in every use 
of an indexical. In every utterance of “he”, for instance, there is something that keeps 
constant, despite the fact that this indexical can be used to refer to many different people. 
This “something in common” present in all utterances of an indexical 
expression is what Kaplan called the character of the indexical, the linguistic rule that is 
attached to the expression. Since linguistic rules of expressions are fixed by the linguistic 
conventions of language, it is plausible to define character as the linguistic meaning of the 
indexical
33
. Most importantly, the character is the semantic feature of indexicals that 
                                                          
32
 Kaplan later changes his mind in Kaplan (1989b). He claims that what completes a demonstrative is a 
directing intention. More on demonstrations below. 
33
 We will see, however, that this definition might be mistaken. There seem to be good reasons not to equate 
character with linguistic meaning. Kaplan himself sometimes seems to hesitate in identifying the two. Cf. 
Kaplan (1989a), pp. 505, 520-1, 523-4; (1989b), 568, 577-8. 
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determines the content in a context and it is associated with indexicals as types, not tokens 
or utterances. In other words, the character is something like an instruction that is attached 
to the word as a type (somewhat like a dictionary definition) and which “guides” the 
speakers and hearers to the referent in every situation in which it is uttered. When an 
indexical is used, it is its character that captures the object being referred to in that 
occasion. Thus, the character of “he” would be something like “the discriminated male”, 
and it should be known (even if tacitly) by every competent speaker. In Kaplan’s words: 
The character of an expression is set by the linguistic conventions and, in turn, 
determines the content of the expression in every context. Because character is 
what is set by linguist conventions, it is natural to think of it as the meaning in 
the sense of what is known by the competent language user. (Kaplan, 1989a, p. 
505) 
To make it clearer, we can summarize the properties of character in Kaplanian 
semantics as follows: 
Character 
i) Determines the content in a context of use 
ii) Is the linguistic meaning of indexicals 
iii) Is a property of expressions as types 
iv) Is what is known by the competent speaker 
Content, on the other hand, is what is determined by the character in the 
context, i.e., its semantic value
34
. In this case, the content of an indexical expression is 
what is referred to in the occasion of its use. When I utter “he is fat”, for instance, the 
content of the indexical “he” will be the object being demonstrated by me. It is the referent 
of the indexical that is its semantic value (its contribution to the truth conditions of the 
sentence), not its character. This, of course, is the fundamental difference between Fregean 
semantics and direct reference: it is the object itself that constitutes the semantic value of 
the indexical, not some qualitative content such as the character. Indexicals, therefore, 
                                                          
34
 This exposition is obviously simplified. Kaplan says that not only indexicals have character and content, 
but also all other linguistic expressions (words and sentences alike). The point is that in indexical expressions 
the character is not identical with its content, while in all other linguistic expressions (non-indexical 
expressions) the character = content (Cf. Kaplan (1989a), p. 507, 533). In addition, character is 
compositional, i.e., the character of the parts determines the character of the whole expression. So, for 
example, the character of the sentence “she starts her new job tomorrow” will be composed by the character 
of all indexical and non-indexical components, which in turn will provide the content in the context. 
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express singular propositions (propositions that have objects as their constituents) 
whenever they are used. 
The distinction between the two types of meaning of indexicals seems to 
capture the idea of shifting content as well as the constant linguistic meaning: the character 
is given by the linguistic rules and hence remains constant in every use of the indexical, 
while the content is the object determined by the character in a context. So, we have the 
following picture: 
Character + context → content 
Having all this in mind, let us see an example of Frege’s Puzzle as arising for 
sentences involving indexicals and how it supposedly can be accounted for in terms of 
character.  
2.3 Indexicals and Frege’s Puzzle 
Consider the following case. I am at a family reunion and I am showing an old 
photograph album to my aunt. I then point at one ugly and skinny boy at the corner of a 
picture and say “I am he”35. She gets really surprised, for I am now much different from 
the kid in question and much better looking. Despite the referent being the same for both 
“I” and “he” my aunt obviously learned something new after hearing this sentence that she 
did not know before. The case would be completely different if I said “he is he” pointing at 
the picture twice, which she would find trivial and uninformative (and rather idiotic). How 
can her surprise and the informativeness of the sentence be explained by direct reference 
theorists? In other terms, why the cognitive value of “I am he” is different from the 
cognitive value of “he is he”? 
 Clearly this cannot be explained in terms of the content expressed, of what I 
said. To recapitulate, direct reference theorists, being Millian heirs, hold that the semantic 
value of an indexical is just its referent. This being so, the proposition expressed in this 
case is simply the self-identity a=a, for both “he” and “I” refer to the same object: me, 
Filipe. Singular propositions, as I said previously, are not adequate for explaining cognitive 
                                                          
35
 I am ignoring the possible complications of this case. It is not plain obvious that the deferred demonstrative 
involved in this case (pointing to a picture but purporting to refer to the person depicted) functions exactly in 
the same way as the demonstrative reference to a flesh and blood person in my vicinities. However, in this 
case, I think it is harmless to assume that it does. 
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value. However, there is a new notion available to direct reference theorists that can 
explain my aunt’s surprise, and it does so in a very elegant way. 
Recall the properties (ii) and (iv) of the character mentioned above:  
 
ii)   Is the linguistic meaning of indexicals 
iv)  Is what is known by the competent speaker 
Item (iv) is crucial. If a competent speaker must know the character in order to 
use an indexical successfully (after all, it is the meaning of the expression), then it must 
play some sort of cognitive role in each use of the indexical. The speaker must have it in 
mind in one way or another in order to refer to the intended object in the appropriate way 
or to understand what it is said. If the character already has this epistemic dimension, can it 
explain cognitive value? Kaplan (1989a) and Perry (1993a) believe that it can
36
. 
Let us take a look at what would be the characters of “I” and “he”. The 
character of “I” could be something like “the person who produced this utterance” or “the 
present speaker”, whereas the character of “he”, as said above, could be “the discriminated 
male”37. It is clear that the two characters are very different, but both are presented or 
defined in the form of definite descriptions. In fact, it hardly seems possible to do so 
otherwise. But what is the relevance of this? Let me explain. Descriptions express 
conditions that must be met in order for an object to be the description’s satisfier. So, any 
description will express a condition C, and only if the object satisfies the condition C it 
will be the object denoted by the description. In other words, descriptions present an object 
in a certain way, as the object that is so and so, as the satisfier of a certain condition. 
Descriptions express – to borrow Fregean terminology – modes of presentation of objects, 
which means that they provide some cognitive perspective over the objects they describe. 
Characters, by being some sort of description that must be mastered by any 
competent speaker, do the same thing; namely, they present the referent under some mode 
of presentation, under some perspective. Of course, they are linguistic modes of 
                                                          
36
 Kaplan’s and Perry’s terminology regarding indexicals differ slightly. What Kaplan calls “character”, Perry 
calls “role”, for example. However, the theoretical role these notions play are the same, so I stick to Kaplan’s 
more famous terminology.  
37
 I say that the character “could be” this or that because its exact formulation for each indexical is a matter of 
debate. It is enough if we try to capture some intuitive definition. 
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presentation which are fixed by the conventions of language, but are modes of presentation 
nevertheless. Both characters of “I” and “he” – “the present speaker” and “the 
discriminated male” – express certain conditions that an object must satisfy in order to be 
the referent of “I” and “he”: be the present speaker and be the discriminated male. Because 
of this, these indexicals necessarily present their referents under some mode of 
presentation, as the present speaker or as the discriminated male. Most importantly, the 
conditions expressed by characters must be grasped by every competent speaker. When a 
speaker intends to use the word “he”, for example, she must know that the object she is 
referring to satisfies the condition of being the discriminated male – and so must the 
audience. 
This is why a sentence like “I am he” can be informative. Each indexical 
presents the referent in different ways: the indexical “I” presents an object as the present 
speaker while the indexical “he” presents an object as the discriminated male. Those of 
course are distinct conditions that could be satisfied by distinct objects. In the context 
described above, however, the satisfier of these conditions is one and the same: me, Filipe. 
My aunt, by being a competent speaker who knows how to use and interpret utterances of 
“I” and “he”, grasps that the two modes of presentation present the same object. In other 
words, given her knowledge of language, she understands that I am being referred to twice 
under different (linguistic) modes of presentation, i.e. that I satisfy the two distinct 
conditions associated with the indexicals. This is the reason why she can become surprised 
and informed; the referent is the same, but it is being referred to in different ways. 
So, in technical terms, the same content can be presented and apprehended 
under different characters. As we saw, the same content (Filipe) can be apprehended under 
the character of “I” and under the character of “he” in a context. This makes the sentence 
“I am he” informative in opposition to the trivial “he is he”, which presents the referent 
twice in the same way. This applies to all other possible contents that can be expressed by 
indexical sentences. In the example given above the content expressed was a singular 
proposition of identity, but it does need to be so. Any kind of singular proposition 
expressed by indexicals can be grasped under different characters. In short, characters are 
ways of accessing the contents expressed by indexical sentences. Moreover, since 
characters are the linguistic meanings of indexicals, they are already given by the rules of 
language, which any competent speaker should master. Because characters are capable of 
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acting on the speakers’ cognition, they can explain cognitive value. Different characters, 
then, can cause different behaviors toward the same content. Let us see some other 
examples to make this clearer: 
Perry’s supermarket (Perry, 1993b): Suppose I am shopping at a supermarket 
when I see in a distant mirror that a man is leaving a trail of sugar wherever he 
goes. I then think “he is making a mess”. To warn the man, I speed my cart in 
the aisle, but then I realize that the man in the mirror is myself. I then think “I 
am making a mess”, so I start to check the things in my cart. I grasp the same 
content twice, but my behavior is very different because I grasp it under 
different characters. 
Perry’s bear (Perry, 1993a): I am in my yard with a friend when a huge bear 
approaches him. He screams “I am about to be attacked”, rolls up in a ball and 
stays as still as possible. I, more or less at the same time, scream “you are 
about to be attacked” and run inside to grab my shotgun. The same content is 
expressed by both sentences: the singular proposition containing my friend and 
the property of being attacked. However, he grasps it under the character of 
“I”, which leads him to a certain behavior, while I grasp it under the character 
of “you”, which leads me to a different behavior. 
Kaplan’s pants (Kaplan, 1989a): I see in a window’s reflection that a man has 
his pants on fire. I laugh saying “his pants are on fire”. After perceiving a 
disturbing smell, I notice that the man in the reflection is me. I then say “My 
pants are on fire!”, so I run for help. Same content, different characters, 
different responses.  
In all those cases, the same content – the same singular proposition – Is being 
expressed or grasped twice. However, this content is being expressed or apprehended 
under different characters, under different modes of presentation. Those modes of 
presentation are what affect the cognitive life of speakers, leading to different responses 
and different behaviors toward the same content. Characters, therefore, individuate 
cognitive value: different character, different cognitive value. Frege’s Puzzle is then 
solved. 
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 To sum up, contents are not able to account for cognitive value because they 
are too coarse-grained to individuate cognitive values. This is no news, for we saw earlier 
that pure Millian semantics seems ill suited in principle for solving Frege’s Puzzle. 
Characters, on the other hand, explain quite well why certain sentences involving 
indexicals are trivial while others are informative. Each indexical’s character provides a 
type of cognitive perspective over its referent, which can lead to different speaker 
responses. Hence, it is the character that bridges the gap between pure referentialist 
semantics and epistemology, thus conforming direct reference to the Fregean approach. 
It is clear that this discussion has a very obvious Fregean flavor. Characters in 
Kaplanian semantics perform two of the roles performed by Fregean senses: they are the 
modes of presentation of the referent and what the competent speaker grasps when he 
understands an expression. The trick that direct reference theorists did is that they managed 
to keep these ‘Fregean senses’ out of the propositional content, avoiding all the problems 
that caused the reaction against Frege in the first place. Characters, therefore, are like 
Fregean senses, but the cognitive perspective they provide is kept only at the level of 
linguistic meaning and it is not, to use Wettstein’s phrase, absorbed by the proposition as 
in Fregean semantics. 
Now it is easy to understand why indexicals are the ideal starting point for the 
semanticist who endorses the Fregean model of semantics. As we saw, an answer to the 
problem of cognitive value seems readily available through the notion of character. What is 
important is that this notion was not introduced specifically with Frege’s Puzzle in mind; it 
was not a somewhat artificial or ad hoc move desperately done by direct reference theorists 
to explain cognitive value. It feels very natural. Characters were introduced to account for 
the semantics of indexicals and it seems almost a coincidence that they can also answer the 
puzzle with such plausibility. In other words, little effort is required to explain cognitive 
value in the case of indexicals. Once the distinction between character and content was 
made (with the needs of direct reference in mind), the rest followed more or less naturally. 
2.4 Counter examples 
Yet, not every direct reference theorist accepted the solution of Frege’s Puzzle 
via character. Howard Wettstein was one of them. In Wettstein (1986), he argues that 
Kaplan’s and Perry’s solution only seemingly explain cognitive value. If we consider some 
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other more problematic examples, he thinks, it will become clear that the explanatory 
power of character is not as strong as it seems: 
Wettstein’s neo-Fregean attack (Wettstein, 1986): imagine two utterances of 
“He is about to be attacked by a neo-Fregean”, but neither the speaker nor the 
audience know that the same individual is being referred to twice. In fact, it 
looks like two different individuals are being referred to. It is obvious that the 
cognitive value of these utterances is very different, for they can lead to very 
different responses and behaviors. 
Wettstein’s rock star (Wettstein, 1986): suppose that a rock singer is 
performing on a stage and he is wearing make-up and clothes in such a way 
that his left side is completely different from his right side. I then say “he is he” 
to someone, but in a way that the first “he” is uttered from location A while the 
second “he” is uttered from location B, dragging the hearer along with me. The 
hearer then learns that the man seen from the right side is actually the same 
man seen from the left side.  
In both cases, the same indexical is used twice to refer to the same object. 
Hence, the same linguistic meaning is operating and the same singular proposition is being 
expressed. However, it is clear enough that in both examples there is a difference in 
cognitive value. How can this happen if they involve precisely the same character? In 
Kaplan’s (simplified) theory, as presented above, cognitive value is individuated by the 
character; sameness of character, then, should entail sameness of cognitive value. Yet, this 
is not the case. Recanati (1990) also argues along the same lines, borrowing an example 
from Perry:  
Recanati’s (and Perry’s) ship (Recanati, 1990): I say “this ship [pointing to 
part of a ship though a window] is a steamer but this ship [pointing to part of a 
ship through another window] is not a steamer”. Unbeknownst to me, both 
parts belong to the same ship. Kaplan and Perry would be forced to say that I 
am irrational, because the same object is being presented under the same 
linguistic mode of presentation (“this ship”) and I nevertheless express (and 
believe) a contradiction. However, it does not seem plausible to say that I am 
irrational. 
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These examples seem to show that it is not possible to explain cognitive value 
via character, for the linguistic meaning is not enough to individuate cognitive value. 
Again, sameness of character should entail sameness of cognitive value; yet these 
examples show that this thesis may be mistaken. In fact, it is easy to think of many cases of 
“he = he”, “that = that” or “this = this”, where exactly the same linguistic meaning is 
involved and even so there is a difference in cognitive value.  
2.5 Demonstrations to the rescue 
One could attempt to rescue Kaplan’s theory by stressing the importance of 
demonstrations in demonstrative reference. In all counter-examples above the distinction 
between pure indexicals and demonstratives (section 1.1) seems to be overlooked. Recall 
that demonstratives (“he”, “this”, “that”) are the type of indexical that can only secure a 
referent with an associated demonstration. Demonstrations, then, are necessary for the 
demonstrative to be successfully used. Because of this, we should consider the possibility 
that the difference in cognitive value in the examples above lies in a difference between 
associated demonstrations. It could be argued that the demonstration together with the 
utterance is semantically relevant to determining the referent and that it does so in a 
cognitively significant manner.  If this is true, then it seems that we can preserve the idea 
that characters can account for cognitive value. Kaplan’s and Perry’s solution would be 
correct after all. 
Kaplan himself explicitly says that demonstrations too have a character: “(…) 
we can associate with each demonstration a character which represents the ‘meaning’ or 
manner of presentation of the demonstration” (Kaplan, 1989a, p. 527). The reasoning 
behind this idea is simple. When a demonstration occurs, a pointing, for instance, it 
presents the object demonstrated under some perspective, in the sense that when we point 
at something we necessarily do it from a determinate angle and in a determinate way. It 
necessarily exploits some appearance or other of the relevant object in that context. In fact, 
Kaplan claims that demonstrations function very similarly to definite descriptions; so 
similarly that we can express the character of a demonstration as the description “the 
individual that has appearance A from here now”, where “an appearance is something like 
a picture with a little arrow pointing to the relevant subject” (Kaplan, 1989a, p. 526).  
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If demonstrations too have characters and if no demonstrative is complete 
without a demonstration, then it seems plausible to conclude that the character of a 
complete demonstrative (word + demonstration) is given by the combination of 
demonstrative’s character with the demonstration’s character. To test this idea, let us see 
how it could account for the counter examples above. 
Consider Wettstein’s rock star example. There is a difference in cognitive 
value even when the same indexical – “he is he” – is used twice. However, the two 
utterances of “he” are produced from very different perspectives. There is obviously a 
dramatic change in spatial location between the two utterances. If this is the case, then the 
accompanying demonstrations that must take place in order to secure a referent exploit 
very different appearances of the demonstratum. In other words, the manner of 
presentation of each associated demonstration that accompany the demonstratives is 
radically different, because one exploits the perspective from location A while the other 
exploits the perspective from location B. In Kaplanian terms, then, the two associated 
demonstrations have completely different characters: one is “the individual with the 
appearance A from here now” and the other “the individual with the appearance B from 
here now”. Since these descriptions are clearly different, they present the referent in 
distinct ways. Hence, if we look at the complete character of both demonstratives, we will 
see that they differ significantly. We would have something like 
he [α] = he [β] 
where [α] and [β] are the characters of the associated demonstrations and “he [α]” and “he 
[β]” are the complete demonstratives. The two sides of the identity are different in 
character, so character individuates cognitive value after all. 
The same argument can be applied to the other examples. They all involve the 
same demonstrative used twice, but their accompanying demonstrations differ in a 
significant manner. If this is the case, then the character of each complete demonstrative 
flanking the identity sign will be different in the end, in accordance with Kaplan’s and 
Perry’s theory. 
 In a footnote, Wettstein briefly points out a problem with this move. He argues 
that “ostending is inessential to the use of demonstratives” (Wettstein, 1986, footnote 17) 
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and that it is not evident how the above solution would be applied to cases in which there is 
no demonstrative gesture being performed. However, I think that he did not take into 
account that Kaplan’s notion of demonstration is not limited to ostension; it is meant to 
include cases in which no pointing gesture is performed. Of course, the theoretical notion 
of demonstration offered by Kaplan would need to be developed in order to explain those 
cases adequately. The point is that, at least in principle, Kaplan’s notion of demonstration 
is not affected by Wettstein’s objection. However, I think that this solution faces more 
serious problems. 
Kaplan holds that demonstrations should be considered as types
38
. This thesis 
may not initially seem very relevant, but I believe it is very important for the argument 
above. Let us see why. 
Remember property (iii) of characters: 
iii)   Character is a property of expressions as types 
If demonstrations were not considered as types, it would not be possible to 
form a single character compositionally from the demonstration and the demonstrative as 
the solution requires, or it would seem very implausible to do so. The reason is the 
following. If demonstrations were considered as tokens, then their characters would be a 
property of tokens, not types
39
. This seems to contradict the idea that characters are general 
rules of language that have to be mastered, because a character would be formed only 
circumstantially, at the occasion of the tokening of the demonstration, and would not exist 
prior to the utterance as Kaplan intended. This view would also be compromised with 
some weird union of tokens (demonstrations) and types (words). Tokens are physical 
things, while types are abstract things. How can compositionality be uniformly applied to 
entities of such different categories? It seems to me that it cannot, at least not in an evident, 
neat, and non-ad-hoc way. Thus, in order to form the character of the complete 
demonstrative compositionally, both the character of the associated demonstration and of 
the demonstrative must be applied to the same kind of thing, i.e., types. Moreover, Kaplan 
thinks that the same demonstration can be repeated by a different agent and at a different 
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 Cf. Kaplan (1989a), p. 525. 
39
 In fact, it seems that character as applied to tokens would be a very different property than the character of 
expressions as types, for it would involve things like spatial locations and instants of time, and it would be 
non-repeatable. 
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place
40
. This would not be possible if demonstrations were considered as tokens, since they 
would be non-repeatable and non-transferrable. Hence demonstrations must be types, not 
tokens. 
The problem with this idea is the following. If demonstrations are types, then 
they can be tokened infinitely many times and at different places, as Kaplan thinks is the 
case. This means that n number of demonstration tokens can have exactly the same 
character, because they can all be instances of the same demonstration type. How can this 
explain cases where the same demonstration type is involved, yet the cognitive value of the 
utterance clearly differs? I will borrow an example from Taschek (1987) to make this 
clearer. I quote at length: 
Suppose, for example, that I am strapped to a chair in a controlled 
environment and a speaker in the room points to a particular object in the room 
and says to me: 
(2) That is an F. 
I believe him. During this time, I correctly believe myself to be in Ann 
Arbor. Immediately after the demonstration, I am rendered unconscious. For 
whatever reasons (…) I believe, when I wake up, that a great deal of time has 
passed, that I am no longer in Ann Arbor, and that I have been moved to 
Baltimore. I find myself, however, seated in the same place in a room exactly 
like the one I was in before. Beside me is the same man who was in the previous 
room. And before me is an object that looks exactly like the one I was shown in 
Ann Arbor. I think to myself: Ah, they're trying to fool me into thinking that 
we're still in Ann Arbor! In fact, we still are in Ann Arbor; and everything, 
including the object is exactly as it was before, and only seconds have passed. As 
soon as I regain consciousness, the man points at the object in exactly the same 
way as before and says,  
 (3) That is an F.  
But for one reason or another, I do not believe that the object demonstrated in 
Ann Arbor was moved to Baltimore. This being the case, I do not believe what 
the man says. I believed what he said when he uttered (2), but, without changing 
my mind about that, I do not believe what he said when he uttered (3). Thus, (2) 
and (3) differ for me in cognitive value. (Taschek, 1987, p. 174) 
In this example, it seems evident that, if there are such things as demonstration 
types and tokens, this would be a case where two tokens of the same demonstration type 
are being performed. The two pointing gestures in (2) and (3) exploit exactly the same 
perspective, are performed exactly at the same place and demonstrate exactly the same 
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 Cf. Kaplan (1989a), p. 525-6. 
59 
 
object. In other words, their character is expressed by the description “the individual that 
has appearance A from here now” and their demonstrata are identical. The only difference 
is that the two tokens are performed at distinct instants of time; but this is trivial, because 
two numerically different demonstration tokens cannot be tokened at the exact same place 
and at the same time. Therefore, there is no distinction whatsoever between the complete 
characters (demonstrative + demonstration) of the two utterances of “this” in (2) and (3): 
the demonstrative used is the same and the demonstration type is the same as well. Yet, I 
regard one sentence as true, while the other as false. Their cognitive values obviously 
differ to me. How this can be explained if the character is identical in both utterances of 
“that”?  
Those skeptical of Taschek’s counter-example can offer several replies in order 
to avoid its complications. For instance, one might be tempted to say that the difference in 
cognitive value arises due to a difference in context: since the contexts in which (2) and (3) 
are uttered are clearly distinct, their cognitive values are distinct as well, and hence the 
example poses no threat to Kaplan’s theory. This response, however, is not available to the 
referentialist who wants to explain cognitive value as an aspect of meaning. The reason is 
simple: contexts are not in any plausible sense a semantic feature of expressions, as are 
characters and contents. In other words, contexts are the external things that the meanings 
of indexicals are sensitive to, which provide the necessary parameters for determining the 
content of those indexicals; they do not constitute their meanings in any sense in Kaplan’s 
theory. Meanings and contexts are obviously related, but are totally distinct and 
independent things. Therefore, under the Fregean conception of semantics, resorting to 
contexts to explain cognitive value is not an open possibility. 
Of course, if one goes Fregean and loads contextual parameters into some level 
of meaning (as Frege did), one can attempt to explain the above example in terms of some 
semantic property of expressions: since the contexts of (2) and (3) have different times as 
parameters, by incorporating these parameters (2) and (3) would then have different 
meanings, and thus different cognitive values. Clearly, this level of meaning into which 
contextual parameters could be loaded cannot be the character, because it would then no 
longer be constant and fixed by the rules of language. However, it could very well be the 
content. If the contents of (2) and (3) are eternal propositions (i.e., propositions that 
incorporate times and places), then these propositions would clearly be distinct, for they 
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would have different instants of time as ingredients. This could perhaps explain the 
difference in cognitive value between the utterances that express them. This solution, 
however, cannot explain why the same utterances could be trivial: if I was not rendered 
unconscious in the example above, and the speaker proceeded exactly as he did, (2) and (3) 
would have precisely the same cognitive value despite being uttered in different contexts 
and expressing different eternal propositions. If this explanation was correct, a difference 
in context (and thus a difference in eternal propositions) should entail a difference in 
cognitive value, but this is clearly not the case. 
It could be argued that, if I am not rendered unconscious, then the context of 
(2) and (3) would be the same, and hence (2) and (3) would have the same cognitive value 
after all. My epistemic state seems to affect the context somehow. This argument, 
however, is highly implausible. It assumes a notion of context that is not the Kaplanian 
one. The context in the relevant sense involves only the parameters necessary to supply the 
contents to the expressions in that context. As Kaplan says, “context is a package of 
whatever parameters are needed to determine the referent, and thus the content, of the 
directly referential expressions of the language” (Kaplan, 1989b, p. 591). As it seems clear, 
my mental state and my perceptual tracking of the object have no relevance whatsoever to 
providing what is necessary to determine the content in the context: the determined content 
is exactly the same whether I become unconscious or not. For this reason, the 
contingencies of my epistemic life are not included in the aforementioned package of 
needed parameters
41
. They simply do not matter. In other terms, if the contexts are 
different when I am rendered unconscious, then they are also different when I am not. 
Epistemic states are surely important to the context of communication understood in a 
broad and intuitive sense, but they have no significance for the semantically relevant 
notion of context. 
What seems to be happening in the example above is that I have mistaken 
beliefs about the contexts in which (2) and (3) are uttered, and for this reason I take the 
contents of “that” to be different. Could I also for this reason be mistaken about their 
characters, taking them to be different when in fact they are not? This would explain why 
their cognitive value differ to me. This line of reasoning, however, seems very doubtful. As 
Kaplan says, “although a lack of knowledge about the context (…) may cause one to 
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mistake the Content of a given utterance, the Character of each well-formed expression is 
determined by the rules of language (…), which are presumably known to all competent 
speakers” (Kaplan, 1989a, p. 548). If this is right, then the difference in cognitive value in 
Taschek’s example arises not due to any incompetence or wrong beliefs regarding the 
characters of “that” in (2) and (3): I know all there is to know about their semantics 
(demonstration + demonstrative), and even so I mistake their contents. Put another way, I 
am not ignorant of any aspect of the meaning of (2) and (3); their characters are established 
independently of the contexts (and the referents) about which I have mistaken beliefs. 
Characters, remember, are given descriptively, and thus qualitatively, by linguistic norms 
(or, in the case of demonstrations, by the appearance of objects). Contrary to contents, 
characters do not directly involve or depend on any particulars about which 
misidentification is possible (and common): they are abstract types. If this is correct, 
mistakes about characters necessarily involve some sort of semantic incompetence, which 
is clearly not the case in the example above. Knowing the language is sufficient for 
knowing the character. Wrong beliefs about contexts, thus, cannot cause a speaker to be 
mistaken about the characters of the indexicals occurring in those contexts. Only some 
defect in linguistic competence can do so. 
Contexts, then, are either not available to the referentialist sympathetic to the 
Fregean approach or cannot explain the phenomena even if its relevant parameters are 
somehow incorporated at the level of content. Furthermore, mistaken beliefs about 
contexts have no bearing at all on my competence with the relevant characters. Worse yet, 
the same kind of problem arises even when demonstrations of the same type are performed 
in the same context. Consider this example offered by Bozickovic (2009):  
An illusionist may come up with a trick creating the impression that an object 
sitting in one spot has been replaced with another one qualitatively identical with 
it, whereas this is not so. In the process, he may say: ‘This1 is this2’, where both 
utterances of ‘this’ are consecutively taken to refer to the same object, while 
relying on demonstrations that are of the same type (as in keeping his arm fixed 
in one position while uttering the sentence). (Bozickovic, 2009, p. 546). 
In this case, the sentence “this is this” is uttered in a single context, and yet the 
cognitive values of the two occurrences of “this” are obviously distinct: I may think that 
the illusionist is saying something false or I may learn something new by hearing his 
utterance. Salmon (1986, pp. 74-4) has a similar example. Imagine that Marco has two 
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friends, Paul and Peter, who are identical twins, and hence qualitatively undistinguishable. 
Imagine also that Paul is standing in front of Marco. If I blindfold him for a few seconds, 
and then release the blindfold, Marco would not know for sure if it is Paul or Peter 
standing in front of him. If I say “he is he” during the entire process (the first “he” before 
the blindfolding and the second “he” after the blindfolding) I would speak informatively 
(or non-trivially). The two occurrences of “he”, therefore, have different cognitive values 
despite having identical characters. How could this be possible if in both cases the 
demonstratum, the demonstrative, the demonstration type and even the contexts are the 
same? 
One could object that the contexts are not the same: they shift midsentence 
between the two occurrences of “this” or “he” in the examples above, and this is why their 
cognitive values differ. First, this is a very implausible view in its own right
42
. As I argued 
earlier, being blindfolded of course effects a change in the context of communication 
understood in an intuitive and general sense, but it has no relevance of any kind to the 
appropriate notion of context, i.e., the package of parameters needed to supply the contents 
to expressions. Put another way, the illusionist’s trick and the blindfolding alter the 
subject’s awareness of the relevant context, not the context itself, which is the same for 
both occurrences of “this” and “he”. Moreover, consistency requires that we maintain that 
the context shifts in every occurrence of a demonstrative. This thesis, however, is far from 
obvious. Second, even if the contexts do shift, this does not explain why the same 
utterances can be trivial, as I argued above. If Marco is not blindfolded (or if the 
illusionist’s trick fails), the utterances of “he is he” (or “this is this”) should also be 
informative, for the contexts would be distinct for each occurrence of the demonstratives. 
But they would not be informative. This view generates informativeness where there is 
none.  
Any appeal to contexts, then, seems doomed. A way of explaining those cases 
without resorting to contexts is by pointing out that the demonstration tokens are 
numerically distinct despite being of the same type. The cognitive value would then lie 
                                                          
42
 Caplan (2003) apparently holds this view. Braun (1996) also discusses (but rejects) it. Perhaps there are 
some special words that can induce a context-shift midsentence, like “now” in “now is not now”. However, 
this is not the case in the given examples. In any case, the claim that contexts can shift midsentence is 
certainly not a very obvious one and it is something that must be argued for; it is certainly not in keeping 
with how we intuitively individuate contexts. 
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somehow in the numerical distinctness of the tokens: different demonstration tokens must 
have different characters. However, this is not what Kaplan’s theory says. Remember, 
according to Kaplan, a difference in cognitive value is explained by a difference in 
character. If demonstrations are types, then they are abstract things which cannot involve 
spatial or temporal properties, i.e., they cannot have any property that distinguishes one 
occurrence of the type from another occurrence of the same type. Thus, if the character is 
attached to the demonstration as a type, it cannot be affected by the circumstances of its 
tokening. All tokenings of the same type will share precisely the same character. 
In order to solve this problem, it seems necessary to abandon the idea that 
character is applied to demonstrations as types. If it were possible to think of characters as 
being a property of tokens or occurrences, then it appears that characters could be sensitive 
to spatial and temporal properties, thus explaining the difference in cognitive value in 
terms of a difference in those properties. Different demonstration tokens would differ at 
least in temporal properties. If this is the case, then each tokening would generate different 
characters, which would entail different cognitive values, explaining the informativeness of 
the examples above. 
 This, however, starts to sound as a far cry from Kaplan’s original theory. First, 
this new notion of character as a property of tokens seems very different from the notion of 
character as linguistic meaning, in the sense of a general rule fixed by the conventions of 
language. Each demonstration token will have a new character, which is contextually 
determined every time a demonstrative reference occurs. In other words, the character of a 
complete demonstrative would be produced on the spot, and not established prior to its 
utterance (or occurrence). The character, therefore, will no longer be stable and fixed as 
Kaplan originally held, but generated only in the occasion of its production. The idea that 
characters are contextually determined seems incompatible with the idea that characters are 
linguistic meanings, which are evidently fixed by the rules of language prior to any 
utterances. Also, in order to preserve compositionality, characters cannot be applied to 
linguistic expressions as types either, because this would require the strange union of 
tokens and types I mentioned above. Thus, character should be a property of linguistic 
expressions as tokens (or occurrences). 
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 Second, it does not sound wrong to say that a demonstrative, as a word, has a 
linguistic meaning which is constant and stable, like a dictionary definition. But what 
about demonstration tokens? If demonstration tokens have characters and characters are 
linguistic meanings, then it should not seem strange to say that demonstration tokens have 
linguistic meanings. But it does. Tokens are potentially infinite; it is not possible to provide 
dictionary definitions to all of them. Of course, demonstrations seem rule-governed such as 
linguistic expressions, but to say that these rules are linguistic meanings is to stretch this 
notion to the point of rupture. Moreover, even if we consider the rules that govern 
demonstrations as some sort of linguistic meaning, these rules would have to be very 
general; hence, they would not be fine-grained enough to individuate cognitive value, for 
the same rule would govern similar demonstrations that nevertheless have distinct 
cognitive value. We again run into the same problems that the above examples raised
43
. 
This modification in Kaplan’s theory, then, introduces a serious tension between the notion 
of character and of linguistic meaning. 
What this reasoning suggests is that, if we want to solve the problem of 
cognitive value via the notion of character, i.e., via an aspect of the meaning of indexicals, 
we should resolve this tension by abandoning properties (ii) and (iii) of characters: 
ii)  It is the linguistic meaning of indexicals 
iii) It is a property of expressions as types 
Linguistic meanings then would be one thing, while character would be 
another. They would be different semantic features of the same expression. The former 
would still be a property of expressions as types and fixed by the norms of language, as 
Kaplan wanted, but the latter would be a property of their tokens (or occurrences) and 
would be determined only contextually, on the spot, when the demonstratives are 
associated with a demonstration token. This, it seems, could explain why two occurrences 
of the same complete demonstrative can have different cognitive values: the same word, 
when coupled with distinct demonstrations tokens, acquire distinct characters, and hence 
different cognitive values. Luckily enough, there are also semantic reasons for 
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distinguishing character from linguistic meaning that have nothing to do with issues related 
to Frege’s Puzzle. 
2.6 Braun’s revision of Kaplan’s theory 
Braun’s (1996) argument is fairly simple. Forget Kaplanian semantics for a 
moment and think about the sentence “that is bigger than that”, where I point to two cars of 
different sizes. It seems clear that both occurrences of “that” have identical linguistic 
meanings. After all, it is the same word, occurring twice. This is what our pre-theoretical 
notion of linguistic meaning would tell us. Now enter Kaplanian semantics. Kaplan says 
that characters are (i) what determine the referent (content) in a context and (ii) the 
linguistic meanings of indexicals. If both occurrences of “that” have the same linguistic 
meaning, then they have the same character. If they have the same character in the same 
context, then they determine the same referent, and thus the same content. Hence, “that is 
bigger than that” would express the proposition that a certain object is bigger than itself, 
which is obviously a contradiction. Worse yet, this sentence would express this false 
proposition in every context in which it is uttered. 
Braun notes, however, that in his formal language for indexicals Kaplan seems 
to avoid this problem. He would translate the above sentence somewhat as follows:  
(a) That[d1] is bigger than that[d2] 
This means that in his formal language for indexicals Kaplan seems to think 
that multiple occurrences of the same demonstrative must have different characters in 
order to refer to different objects: the function of the symbol [dsubscript] is precisely to 
distinguish one character from another in order to secure distinct objects in the context. 
“That[d1]” refers to the first object in a sequence of objects, “that[d2]” refers to the second 
object in that sequence, and so on. If the characters are different, then two different objects 
are determined, thus ensuring that the proposition expressed is not a contradiction. 
But what do the subscripts accompanying the demonstratives represent in 
natural language? The answer seems clear enough: demonstrations. In his formal language 
Kaplan apparently made a better characterization of demonstratives, that is, he effectively 
incorporated the character of the accompanying demonstration to the character of complete 
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demonstratives. The character of a complete demonstrative then is formed by combining a 
demonstrative with a demonstration. 
What we need to make Kaplan’s theory and his formal language coherent, 
Braun argues, is to draw a sharp distinction between the linguistic meaning of an indexical 
and the character it has in the context of its use. Kaplan’s original two meaning theory of 
indexicals needs to be revised; we need a three meaning theory instead: linguistic meaning, 
character, and content. Linguistic meanings are what we intuitively think they are, i.e., the 
general rules of language attached to the words, or what I earlier called dictionary 
definitions. Together with the accompanying demonstration, linguistic meaning determines 
a character, which in turn determines the content. Putting it more formally, linguistic 
meanings of demonstratives are functions from demonstrations to characters, and 
characters are functions from contexts to contents. We then have this extended picture: 
Linguistic meaning + demonstration → character 
Character + context → content 
To sum up. Character is the semantic feature of expressions that determines the 
content. If two characters are identical, then they determine the same object in the context. 
Thus, we need some distinction between the characters of the two occurrences of “that” in 
“that is bigger than that”; if we do not distinguish them, this sentence will always express a 
contradiction, for it will always refer to the same object twice. The correct way to solve 
this problem, Braun argues, is to distinguish linguistic meaning from character. The 
demonstrative by itself in this revised Kaplanian semantics has no character, only linguistic 
meaning. Linguistic meaning, in a context plus a demonstration, determines a character. It 
is this character that determines the content. In this way, Braun hopes to refine Kaplan’s 
theory, making clearer the importance of demonstrations to the determination of content 
and avoiding the complications arising from the identification of character with linguistic 
meaning. 
It is worth noting that Braun’s revision does not imply that the associated 
demonstrations must be considered as types or that they must be considered as tokens
44
. 
His view seems compatible with both views. In other words, for purposes of determining 
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the referent, it makes no difference to consider demonstrations as types or tokens in 
Braun’s three meaning theory. Both views account equally well for the problematic cases 
he analyzed. 
 However, for the reasons discussed above, if we want to explain Frege’s 
Puzzle resorting to demonstrations, then we have to consider them as tokens. To illustrate 
this, let us look at Braun’s picture, interpreted as taking demonstrations as types: 
Linguistic meaning + demonstration (type) → character 
In Taschek’s example, it is clear that both occurrences of “this” will have the 
same character if the accompanying demonstrations are considered as types. As we saw, 
both demonstrations exploit exactly the same perspective, appearance, gesture, etc. They 
are identical in every aspect except for the time of tokening, which is irrelevant to the 
character as a property of types. So, both utterances of “this is an F” will involve the same 
demonstration type, thus generating the same character two times. From a semantic point 
of view this is harmless. In both utterances the same proposition is being expressed, and 
this fact is predicted and explained by this interpretation. However, if we want characters 
to explain cognitive value, the characters that result from the combination of linguistic 
meaning + demonstration must be different. This is achieved by considering 
demonstrations as tokens. We will then have the following picture: 
Utterance 1: Linguistic meaning + demonstration (token1) → character1 
Utterance 2: Linguistic meaning + demonstration (token2) → character2 
2.7 Kaplan’s revised theory and the solution (?) to Frege’s Puzzle 
We saw that we have some reasons, both epistemic and semantic, for 
distinguishing character from linguistic meaning. On the one hand, there is the linguistic 
meaning of expressions, which is constant and it is fixed by convention. On the other hand, 
there is the character, which is determined by linguistic meaning plus the associated 
demonstration and has the function of determining the content in a context. It is the latter 
feature that accounts for phenomena of cognitive value. Consider Taschek’s example. 
Assuming that demonstrations are tokens, each performance of a demonstrative reference 
will necessarily involve distinct demonstration tokens. If the demonstration tokens are 
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distinct, then they will determine different characters for each utterance of the 
demonstrative “this”. Hence, no two occurrences of the same demonstrative will have the 
same character. This is why (2) and (3) have distinct cognitive values: despite involving 
the same demonstrative (word), they have distinct characters. 
The same explanation goes for any counter examples like those offered by 
Wettstein and Recanati. Again, no two demonstrative references will ever have the same 
character, for they will always involve numerically distinct demonstration tokens. This is 
why accepting the sentence “this ship1 is a steamer but this ship2 is not a steamer” does not 
make me irrational or why “he1 is he2” can be informative and non-trivial. The content is 
precisely the same, but it is presented to my intellect under different modes of presentation 
because two distinct demonstration tokens are at play. The character, which is generated on 
the spot, individuates cognitive value after all. 
Despite the foregoing, this solution generates a problem that is, to my view, 
insuperable. It explains nicely the informativeness and the different cognitive values that 
demonstrative references may have, but what about their triviality? Think of a trivial case 
of “this is this”, where I point twice at the same object. Each pointing will generate a 
different character. For purposes of the determination of reference, this makes no 
difference. Different characters can determine different objects in a context, but is not 
necessarily so. However, if different characters entail different cognitive values, how can a 
sentence involving distinct characters nevertheless be trivial? We can think of innumerable 
examples like this one. There are trivial cases of “he is he”, of “that is that”, of “that is 
this”, etc. They will involve distinct demonstration tokens and so they will have distinct 
characters, but they are trivial nonetheless. If different characters determine different 
cognitive values, then we would have informativeness where in fact there is none. 
To summarize. We saw that linguistic meaning is too coarse-grained to 
individuate cognitive value, for there are sentences that involve precisely the same 
linguistic meaning and are nevertheless informative. We tried to solve this problem by 
stressing the importance of demonstrations in demonstrative reference. We noted that 
demonstrations are semantically relevant to determining the content in the case of 
demonstratives, so they can affect the character of a complete demonstrative. However, if 
demonstrations are considered as types, they are incapable of explaining examples like 
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Taschek’s, where the same demonstration type is involved twice and yet there is a 
difference in cognitive value. Character must then be a property of tokens, so it must be a 
semantic property that is determined on the occasion of the tokening. There are also good 
semantic reasons for this thesis. This apparently solves the problem, because two 
numerically distinct demonstrative references will never involve the same demonstration 
token twice, so they will always generate distinct characters, which entail distinct cognitive 
values. But this creates a problem for explaining triviality. If character is what explains 
cognitive value, then different characters should entail different cognitive value. But this is 
not the case in trivial examples of “he is he” or “this is this”. The characters of the 
demonstrative references are clearly distinct, and yet those sentences are trivial and 
uninformative. This amended Kaplanian semantics solves one problem but creates another 
at the same time. 
2.8 A different solution 
One can attempt to rescue Kaplan’s solution to the problem of cognitive value 
by making a move that can be derived from Kaplan himself. He said that a single ostension 
can have many different demonstrations associated with it: a single gesture can produce 
many different perspectives, and each perspective would count as a different 
demonstration
45
. In other words, Kaplan believed that a single demonstrative performance 
can produce distinct manners of presentation depending on the location of the audience. 
For example, if I point at something, those to my left will have one cognitive perspective 
over the referent, while those to my right will have a different perspective. Hence, the same 
act performed by the speaker can produce many different cognitive values for the audience. 
At the same time, there seems to be nothing to prevent distinct demonstrative gestures to 
produce the same mode of presentation. I can point twice at the same object, but my 
pointing would generate identical perspectives. The consequence of this view is that 
cognitive value seems to be something much more relative, because it depends heavily on 
the side of the audience and not so much on the side of the speaker. Hence, the same 
demonstrative reference may potentially produce many different cognitive values, while 
distinct ostensions can produce the same cognitive values. 
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This idea can be interpreted in two ways: (1) the character is exactly the same 
for every occurrence of a demonstrative, but the accompanying demonstration can provide 
many different cognitive perspectives over the referent, thus explaining the 
informativeness or the triviality of sentences; this being so, the cognitive value is affected 
by the demonstration, but the character is not; (2) there is no single character determined 
by the speaker alone, but each possible cognitive perspective is in fact a different 
character; hence, the character depends on the audience and on their perspectives over the 
referent, not on the speaker who performed the demonstration.  
The first problem with interpretation (1) is obvious. If we assume that 
cognitive value is explained by character, as Kaplan does, then this interpretation is wrong 
from the start. Under this assumption, the character cannot remain the same while 
producing different cognitive values. This was the problem that motivated the revision in 
Kaplan’s theory in the first place. On the other hand, if we drop this assumption, then there 
is no hope for solving Frege’s Puzzle for indexicals in terms of meaning. We can all agree 
that cognitive value is affected by the associated demonstration. Yet, if demonstrations do 
not affect the character of the expression, then we can hardly say that they are 
semantically relevant. We say that the character is semantically relevant because it is the 
feature of expressions that determines the referent. In other words, it performs a role in 
determining the propositional content of the sentence, in establishing its truth conditions. 
By contrast, if the function of demonstrations is simply to provide modes of presentation of 
the referents and not to help determining them, then their function lies outside the sphere of 
semantics. The relevance of demonstrations is merely epistemic. This of course is not a 
problem for the semanticists who do not accept the Fregean model of semantics, but it is a 
huge blow to those who do, for they need to solve Frege’s Puzzle in terms of the semantic 
properties of expressions, and not in terms of something that has no role in semantics 
whatsoever. 
The interpretation (2) preserves the assumption that cognitive value is 
explained by the character, but runs counter a very plausible intuition about the functioning 
of language: when a demonstrative reference is made, it is the speaker who determines a 
single character that must be grasped by the audience, not the audience who determines n 
number of characters according to their perspectives over the referent. Let me explain.  
71 
 
 When a reference is made, we intuitively say that the speaker is responsible 
for correctly using and appropriately the conventions of language. The role of the hearer in 
a communication exchange is to interpret the actions performed by the speaker in the 
appropriate way. Some examples can be provided to support this idea. Suppose, for 
instance, that there is just one woman in front of me and my friend and I say “she is really 
gorgeous” pointing right at her. Suppose also that my friend, for some reason, is not really 
paying attention to me or that he is staring at another woman behind us. I think that it is 
plausible enough to say that I was successful in determining a referent: I used the correct 
indexical and the correct demonstration unambiguously, thus exploring accurately the right 
conventions for demonstrative reference. The fact that my friend did not grasp what I said 
seems irrelevant to the success of my reference. This is even clearer if we imagine that, due 
to my bad timing, the woman heard what I said and got really upset. It seems strange to say 
that for my friend the reference was not successful while for the woman it was successful. I 
intended to convey some information to him, not to the woman, but even so she was able 
to grasp what I wanted to say. In fact, we can say that had other people been there, they 
would have understood me correctly. This statement would not make any sense if reference 
was not something done solely by the speaker. The success or failure of reference, it 
seems, is a matter of exploiting accurately the rules established by the linguistic 
community, and not a matter of divided labor between speaker and audience. 
Understanding a demonstrative reference is a whole other matter. 
Other example that can be offered to support the idea that reference is a matter 
of correct using linguistic rules by the speaker is this
46
. Imagine that I am giving a lecture 
somewhere where there used to be a very impressive painting on the wall just behind the 
place where I am standing. However, this painting was stolen days before and the 
university replaced it with a much less remarkable statue. Being very absent-minded, I did 
not notice the replacement when I started lecturing. At some point I say, pointing with my 
thumb over my shoulder, “that is a remarkable painting”. The audience laughs and I turn to 
see why. Surprised with what I just said, I say “Sorry, what I said is absurd. What I meant 
to say is that the painting that once hanged there was remarkable”. What can we say about 
this case? It seems clear that I exploited perfectly all the conventions for demonstrative 
reference, but nevertheless ended up saying something I did not want to say. I pointed to a 
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single object, predicated something of it and was impeccably understood by the audience. I 
obviously said something false, because the thing I pointed at is not even a painting. But 
had it been the painting I had in mind, I would have said something true. The fact that I 
intended to refer to other object has no relevance whatsoever to what I in fact said. Indeed, 
I would not even correct myself by saying “No, you got me wrong, I said that the painting 
that once hanged there was remarkable”. I did not say that. Even assuming that the 
audience is very comprehensive and have interpreted me in the most charitable way, this 
would not change the fact that I referred to the statue, not to the painting. The rules I 
exploited to make this reference dictate that the proposition expressed has whatever object 
I pointed to as a constituent. What I in fact said may be a surprise even to myself. 
Other examples could be given, but I think those are enough. The upshot of this 
reasoning is that reference seems to depend on the correct use of the rules of language, 
which are pretty much independent of possible hearers and of our own general intentions
47
. 
In other words, the linguistic conventions determine what we say, independently of our 
intentions. Our ability to make successful references depend on our ability to use those 
rules in the right way. Thus, it seems that the job of securing a referent is attributed only to 
the speaker, and not somehow to both speakers and hearers. Hence, if it is the speaker 
alone who refers, then it is he alone that determines the character, not the possible hearers. 
The task of the audience is to interpret the single character the speaker expressed, so that it 
can grasp the content he conveyed. In other words, interpretation (2) says that innumerable 
characters can be generated by a single utterance, but this goes against the idea that it is the 
speaker’s responsibility to secure a referent. Moreover, communication seems very 
mysterious if we allow character to be multiplied in this way. What makes speakers 
understand each other if the semantic feature that guides them to the referent can be 
completely different for each one of them? What makes you understand what I said if what 
determines the referent is something radically distinct for you and me? The character must 
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Kaplan (1989b) and Perry (2009). For very compelling arguments against directing intentions, see Reimer 
(1991a) and (1991b). 
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be univocal for both speakers and hearers. Interpretation (2) makes communication less a 
social enterprise and more an individualistic guessing game. 
The idea presented at the beginning of this section, then, is mistaken. If we 
detach demonstrations from characters, then they will not have any semantic relevance and 
thus cannot explain cognitive value on semantic grounds. On the other hand, if we allow 
characters to be multiplied indefinitely by the number of hearers, then we arrive at a very 
implausible picture of how language works. 
There is one more solution available, offered by Corazza and Dokic (1992). It 
is not exactly a Kaplanian solution, for they do not seem to think that the character is 
capable of accounting for Frege’s Puzzle, but it is close enough and they agree with the 
general Fregean approach to semantics. However, I think their proposal suffers from 
serious problems that cannot be avoided. 
2.9 Corazza and Dokic: acts of perception 
 Corazza and Dokic (1992) accept Kaplan’s distinction between demonstratives 
and pure indexicals, i.e., the distinction between indexicals that require some sort of 
complement and indexicals that do not. However, they say that demonstratives are to be 
combined with acts of perception, not with pointing gestures or with demonstrations in the 
broad sense, as Kaplan suggested. They do not define precisely what an act of perception 
is, but the idea is sufficiently intuitive to be understood and worked with. They say, for 
instance, that Evan’s notion of keeping track of an object is compatible with their notion of 
an act of perception (although they do not explain exactly how). 
But how this solves Frege’s Puzzle? The idea is simple. An instance of “he is 
he” is trivial if it is based on a single act of perception, while an instance of “he is he” is 
informative if it is based on two distinct acts of perception. If I point to an object twice 
without looking away, for example, the demonstratives used will be completed with the 
same perceptual act; hence, my utterance will be uninformative. However, as in Recanati’s 
ship example, the two occurrences of “this ship” are based on distinct perceptual acts, 
because the ship is obstructed in such a way that is not possible to track it continuously 
along its whole extension. In other words, two perception tokens are employed in the 
utterance of “this ship1 is a steamer but this ship2 is not a steamer”. Hence, the two 
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occurrences of “this ship” have distinct cognitive values despite having the same linguistic 
meaning. Of course, Corazza and Dokic are distancing themselves from Kaplan, because 
this solution does not assume that the character is what accounts for cognitive value. They 
do, however, conform to the Fregean model of semantics, for acts of perception are, on 
their view, semantically relevant to determining the referent. 
However ingenious this solution may be, I believe it does not work for the 
following reasons. It is not very clear how it is possible for perceptual acts to have 
semantic relevance. They might explain why and how we understand demonstrative 
reference, but it seems to me that they cannot perform any function whatsoever in 
determining the reference of an utterance. At best, perceptual acts distinguish and 
determine one object for the speaker, but his perceptions cannot be conveyed by any 
linguistic devices, so they are irrelevant for purposes of determining the semantic content 
of an utterance. In other words, perceptual acts might determine for the speaker’s cognition 
the object he intends to refer to; however, since he needs to go from private perceptions to 
language, to communication, he must exploit public conventions that are shared by the 
linguistic community in order to secure the referent. 
Worse yet, perceptions are not always involved in securing a referent even for 
the speaker. Think of the lecture example I gave before. I did not perceive the object I was 
demonstratively referring to – the statue behind me – and yet my reference was successful. 
Of course, I relied on previous perceptions to do that because I believed that there used to 
be such and such a painting behind me, but an actual perception did not play any role in 
my actual demonstrative reference. It was not perception that determined the referent, but 
the fact that I pointed at a single object and exploited all the correct conventions of 
demonstrative reference
48
. On the side of the audience, perception is needed in order to 
fully understand what I expressed, but the referent was already determined by the rules and 
conventions of language I used. Perception needs to come into play if we want to explain 
how demonstrative reference is apprehended and fully understood, but this explanation is 
not part of semantics per se. 
                                                          
48
 See McGinn (1981) for many other examples of demonstrative reference that do not involve perception of 
the demonstratum. 
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Pointing gestures are clearly capable of discriminating one object from another 
in a context. They exploit public rules and conventions that are shared by the whole 
linguistic community, but the same thing cannot be said about acts of perception. 
Perceptions are essentially private things. How can they be semantically relevant in a 
communication exchange? I cannot rely on my perceptions in order to secure a referent for 
the audience. If this were the case, communication would be a solipsistic exercise.  
Even if we grant that perceptual acts do have semantic relevance, they would 
either be unable to explain cognitive value or would incur in the same implausible view of 
communication explained in the previous section. Think of Recanati’s ship example. For 
me, there are two acts of perception involved, so each occurrence of “this” in “this ship1 is 
not this ship2” will have different cognitive values. If we hold that it is the speaker’s 
responsibility to secure a referent, and that acts of perception are semantically relevant, 
then only my acts of perception are responsible for endowing the utterances of “this” with 
the semantic properties they have, and hence with the cognitive value they have. Since the 
two occurrences of “this ship” have distinct cognitive values to me, they should also have 
distinct cognitive values to everyone else. However, imagine that I utter this sentence to 
my friend Clark Kent, who unbeknownst to me has X-ray vision. He can see through the 
obstruction perfectly. It seems obvious that the two occurrences of “this” will have exactly 
the same cognitive value for him, and he will know right away that I am expressing a 
contradiction, despite the fact that they have the same semantic properties. To solve this 
problem, we could argue that acts of perception are semantically relevant for every 
possible subject in the context, so the same utterance will have as many different semantic 
properties as the number of acts of perception involved, and thus as many different 
cognitive values as these acts of perception. In short, every listener determines the referent 
in her own way according to her own acts of perception. Needless to say, this is a highly 
implausible view of how communication occurs, as is the view that characters are 
multiplied according to possible differences in perspective over the referent. 
It is possible to reply that what determines reference is in fact the 
demonstration performed, but the accompanying acts of perception are what explain 
cognitive value. This may very well be true, but again, if perceptual acts do not help to 
determine the referent in any way, then they are outside the scope of semantics. They are 
not an aspect of meaning. Perceptual acts then are not a semantic property of expressions 
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in any plausible sense: they are an epistemological notion that explains cognitive 
phenomena related to language, but they do not do any semantic work. If this is true, 
Corazza and Dokic cannot explain cognitive value from within semantics, as the Fregean 
approach requires. 
2.10  Final blow to the solution via character: pure indexicals 
So far we have been concerned with the problem of cognitive value as it 
appeared in sentences involving demonstratives. However, a more serious problem for 
trying to solve Frege’s Puzzle via character is posed by pure indexicals. Suppose I am 
drunk and happy at a party with my friends. One of them says to me “it is nice here” and I 
agree with him. Not much later, incredibly drunk and completely disoriented, I hear my 
friend saying “it is nice here” again at the exact same place and with exactly the same 
surroundings. However, wrongly believing I have moved to another place, I do not agree 
with him. Those two utterances obviously have different cognitive value to me, because I 
accept one while denying the other. It is important to note that I have not changed my mind 
regarding the one place in question: I still believe what I believed when my friend first 
uttered “it is nice here”, but I disagree with the second utterance because I think I am at a 
different place. Am I irrational? I think not. How can Kaplan’s theory deal with this49? 
Even if the character (or acts of perception) explained successfully cognitive 
value in the case of demonstratives (which it did not), it would not be able to account for 
this case. This is because it is not possible to resort to demonstrations in order to explain 
the difference in cognitive value between the two utterances of “it is nice here” as in the 
example above. The indexical “here” is strictly not a demonstrative; it is a pure indexical, 
which does not require a demonstration in order to secure a referent. The character seems 
to be precisely the same in both occurrences and no demonstration is needed for the 
indexical to secure its referent. In other words, this kind of indexical, i.e., pure indexicals, 
perform their semantic function of determining a referent in a context by themselves. There 
is no need for an accompanying demonstration of any sort, as we saw in section 1.1. The 
character of “here”, “now”, “today” or “I” does not require a complement to discriminate 
one single object in a context. Hence, its character is truly invariable in every possible 
                                                          
49
 Caplan (2003), footnote 26 offers a similar example to make the same point. 
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context of their use. If the character is invariable, so should be the cognitive value. But this 
is clearly not the case. 
Even if one claims that characters of pure indexicals are somehow distinct in 
every occurrence, i.e., generated on the spot, this explanation would face the same problem 
as the explanation for demonstratives. It accounts for informativeness, but not for triviality: 
because two distinct occurrences of a pure indexical would always differ in character they 
should also always differ in cognitive value; yet, as we saw, this is not the case. 
Remember also that the semanticist sympathetic to the Fregean approach 
cannot resort to differences in the context or mistaken beliefs about the context to explain 
differences in cognitive value, as I argued earlier. It seems obvious that these things play 
an essential role in determining the cognitive value of the two utterances in question, but 
contexts are not semantic properties of expressions. They are not in any way a feature of 
meaning. Furthermore, the character is independent of the context; no mistaken belief 
about the context can affect the speaker’s knowledge about the character. 
To recapitulate, then. The only way to make the character of demonstratives 
able to explain cognitive value is to consider the demonstrations that complete 
demonstratives as tokens, not types. However, this move generates a difference in 
cognitive value where there is none, because no two demonstrative references will involve 
the same demonstration tokens, and hence no two demonstrative references will have the 
same character. On the other hand, Corazza and Dokic’s solution fails as well, because it 
relies on the notion of acts of perception, which does not seem to perform any semantic 
work. If it does not, then this apparent explanation of Frege’s Puzzle is not given in terms 
of semantic properties of expressions, but rather by appealing to concepts outside the 
sphere of semantics. This gets even more complicated because Frege’s Puzzle can arise for 
pure indexicals too. In this case, there is not the possibility of appealing to demonstrations 
or acts of perception, because pure indexicals do not need to be complemented in any sort 
of way. Just their utterance is sufficient to determining the content in a context, and hence 
no other semantic feature is needed. 
So, it seems that the solution to Frege’s Puzzle in the case of indexicals cannot 
be given in terms of the character of those indexicals. Every attempt to do that seems either 
to slip outside the sphere of semantics, thus not adequating to the Fregean model, or simply 
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to fail to account satisfactorily for all phenomena of cognitive value. Yet, not all hope is 
lost for the direct reference theorist who wants to explain cognitive value as a property of 
meaning. 
2.11 The solution via reflexive content and concluding remarks  
In light of Wettstein’s (1986) criticisms, Perry (1988) offered a different 
solution to Frege’s Puzzle as arising for indexicals in terms of what he called reflexive 
content. Perry (1988) distinguished between the proposition expressed by an utterance and 
the proposition created by an utterance, and argued that the latter is what explains 
cognitive value. The proposition expressed by an utterance u is its official content (or 
contentC, in later terminology)
50
, i.e., what we would normally regard as what is said in the 
context, its referential truth conditions. On the other hand, the proposition created (or 
contentM
51
) by an utterance u is the proposition which is generated on the occasion of its 
production, which has the utterance u itself as constituent. This created proposition, which 
Perry calls the reflexive content, states the conditions under which the utterance u is true. 
This kind of propositional content is determined solely by the linguistic meaning 
associated with the sentence-type of which utterance u is a token. Put another way, the 
reflexive content is a product of the linguistic rules which are attached to linguistic 
expressions as types and of the occasion of their utterances. These linguistic rules can be 
thought of as the characters of the relevant expressions. Note also that the speaker does not 
need to explicitly and consciously think about the reflexive content of an utterance; since 
this content is derived from linguistic rules, it is presumably grasped automatically and 
effortlessly by every competent speaker of the language. 
Let us see an example. Consider a situation where, pointing to a certain 
professor, I utter to you “she is brilliant”. According to Perry, to fully account for what 
goes on in this situation, we must distinguish between various levels of meaning. First, 
there is the character of “she” and of “is brilliant”, which is associated to these expressions 
as types by the linguistic norms. Second, there is the proposition I literally express in this 
context, which is the official content (contentC), of my utterance: the singular proposition 
containing the professor and the property of being brilliant. Third, there is the reflexive 
                                                          
50
 Cf. Perry (1997), p. 11. 
51
 Idem. 
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content (contentM), which is something along the lines of “there is one discriminated 
female x which is the referent of this utterance of ‘she is brilliant’, and x is brilliant”52. The 
same goes for every indexical that is part of an utterance of a complete sentence. For 
example, the reflexive content of an utterance of “you” will be “the addressee of this 
utterance of ‘you’”, the reflexive content of an utterance of “here” will be “the place which 
is referred to by this utterance of ‘here’”, and so on. As we can see, the reflexive content 
does not contain the demonstratum as an ingredient; it contains only the utterance u itself 
and a general description of the demonstratum in terms of the context and its relation to the 
utterance u. 
This is why one can in some sense understand every utterance of “she is 
brilliant” even if one does not know the referent of “she” in the context: every utterance u 
of this sentence-type creates a proposition that states the conditions that must be met in 
order for the utterance u to be true in the relevant context, and these conditions are derived 
from the linguistic meaning – the character – of the relevant expressions. Thus, the hearer 
grasps the created proposition even if she does not grasp the official content expressed by 
the utterance, which requires more than just linguistic knowledge to be grasped. More 
importantly, since the reflexive content of an utterance has the utterance itself (and its 
relevant parts) as a constituent, each new utterance will produce a different reflexive 
content, i.e., a different created proposition. 
This is why, according to Perry, the utterances of “it is nice here” or “that is an 
F” differ in cognitive value: although their official content is the same, the propositions 
they create are distinct. Since the reflexive content describes the demonstratum in terms of 
its relation to the context and to the utterances themselves, and since the utterances are 
different, the created propositions will describe the demonstratum by expressing different 
relations, and hence will provide different cognitive perspectives over it. Thus, a difference 
in cognitive perspective corresponds to a difference in cognitive value. As Corazza and 
Dokic put it, although linguistic meanings, understood as types, do not determine directly 
the cognitive value, they do so when applied to a given utterance
53. Perry’s reflexive 
content, since it is clearly an aspect of (applied) meaning, thus respects the Fregean 
criterion of adequacy for semantics. 
                                                          
52
 Cf. Perry (1988), p. 7. 
53
 Cf. Corazza & Dokic (1992), p. 187.  
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Given our previous discussion of character and demonstrations, the problem 
with Perry’s solution may seem apparent by now. If we individuate cognitive value in 
terms of utterances, numerically different utterances should have different cognitive 
values. However, this is clearly wrong. We have many trivial instances of “it is nice here” 
or of “that is an F”, as well as trivial utterances of “this is this”, “that ship is that ship”, 
“she is she”, etc., even though each created proposition will have different constituents. In 
other terms, every utterance of an indexical will contribute itself to the propositions that 
are the reflexive contents of the relevant utterances; hence, these utterances should always 
differ in cognitive value. But this is obviously not the case
54
. Utterances are unrepeatable 
and always numerically distinct, as are demonstrations tokens (or occurrences) in Kaplan’s 
revised theory. It is not surprising that they have the exact same problem: they are simply 
too fine-grained to individuate cognitive value correctly. 
If the foregoing discussion is correct, the prospects for the referentialist who 
wants to solve Frege’s Puzzle on semantic grounds look gloomy. Neither the character 
(even in its modified version) nor the reflexive content seem able to explain adequately all 
phenomena of cognitive value for indexicals. This is especially worrisome because 
indexicals, as I argued earlier, are the type of expression that seems most hospitable to a 
semantic theory that conforms to the Fregean criterion of adequacy: their functioning in 
language naturally suggests that they have more than one level of meaning, one of which 
could possibly play the epistemic role of Fregean senses without also having to play their 
semantic role. However, as we saw, none of these levels of meaning are capable of solving 
Frege’s Puzzle, at least in its indexical version. It now remains to be seen how well 
character and reflexive content do when it comes to proper names (spoiler: not very well). 
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 Corazza & Dokic (1992) and Loeffler (2001) make the same point about Perry’s reflexive content. 
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3. Proper Names 
 
3.1 The character of names 
As we saw in the first chapter, Frege’s Puzzle appears not only for indexicals, 
but for singular terms across the board. Names, then, are no exception to the conundrums 
of cognitive value. But they pose a special difficulty for referentialist who accepts the 
Fregean criterion of adequacy for semantics. Even though the two purported solutions to 
the indexical version of the puzzle examined in the last chapter ultimately failed, at least 
that version was more amenable to a meaning-related treatment given the natural 
distinction between the various levels of meaning of indexicals. Frege’s Puzzle for names, 
however, is nowhere near the amenability of its indexical version to a solution on semantic 
grounds. The reason is simple: for most direct reference theorists (Kaplan and Perry 
included), names are just labels for their referents. There is no other level of meaning to a 
proper name other than the object it stands for. In short, the meaning of a proper name is 
exhausted by its referent. If this is right, then all coreferential names, no matter how 
syntactically distinct, have exactly the same meaning. Or, as Kaplan puts it, in proper 
names “all three kinds of meaning – referent, content, and character – collapse. (…) 
Because of the collapse of character, content, and referent, it is not unnatural to say of 
proper names that they have no meaning other than their referent” (Kaplan, 1989a, p. 562). 
Therefore, there is no difference in meaning between “Spider-Man” and “Peter Parker”, or 
between “Hesperus” and “Phosphorus”, that can be exploited by the referentialist in order 
to account for the informativeness of “Spider-Man is Peter Parker” or “Hesperus is 
Phosphorus”. All there is to the semantics of coreferential names is simply identical. How 
can the referentialist account for the cognitive value of proper names on the Fregean 
approach? 
Kaplan himself acknowledges the difficulty: “The problem is that proper 
names do not seem to fit into the whole semantical and epistemological scheme as I have 
developed it” (Kaplan, 1989a, p. 562). Kaplan, then, cannot solve Frege’s Puzzle as arising 
for names. His theory does not have enough resources to do so. In fact, this is a reason to 
suspect in principle his attempt to explain cognitive value via character, even in the case of 
indexicals. Let me explain. If we have a certain class of phenomena and a theoretical entity 
that purports to explain them, then the fact that this entity does not even begin to explain a 
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recognized subclass of the same phenomena gives us enough reason to suspect that it was 
not the entity that we were looking for in the first place. Therefore, if character, understood 
as a semantic property of language in general, really has the epistemic dimension that 
Kaplan claims it has, it should have this dimension for all singular terms, not only for 
indexicals. In other words: if cognitive value could plausibly be explained by character, 
then all phenomena of cognitive value should at least be initially treatable via character. 
But, in the case of proper names, they clearly are not. Characters seem ill suited to explain 
the cognitive value of names right from the outset. If this is correct, then it looks like that 
the apparent relation between cognitive value and character in the case of indexicals that 
Kaplan was so enthusiastic about was merely incidental. Kaplan, maybe impressed with his 
theory of indexicals, overestimated the explanatory power of the entities it postulated.  
But let us not be so pessimistic. Perhaps Kaplan is wrong regarding proper 
names. Perhaps they do have more than one level of meaning besides the referent. If the 
referentialist argues that character and content in proper names do not coincide as Kaplan 
believes, then maybe the character is able solve the name version of the puzzle after all. 
This is obviously a major deviation from Kaplan’s original theory. But, as we saw, if the 
referentialist does not part ways with Kaplan regarding proper names, then she has no hope 
for solving the name version of the puzzle in terms of character. 
There are several ways of explaining what character for proper names would be 
like, but all of them necessarily involve descriptions. There is no other way of doing that: 
characters are rules necessarily given by certain descriptions. Hence, the content of a 
proper name in this modified Kaplan’s theory would still be its referent, but its character 
would be some sort of description. It is important to stress that this is not in any way 
incompatible with direct reference. The biggest lesson from direct reference is that names 
are not equivalent to descriptions at the level of content. It is perfectly compatible with the 
general direct reference framework, then, for proper names to have a level of descriptive 
meaning very much like indexicals (direct reference also gave us very good reasons to 
suppose that proper names do not have descriptive meanings at all, but let us put this 
skepticism aside for a moment). The descriptions that state the characters of proper names 
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just have to function like descriptions coupled with Kaplan’s dthat operator55: they express 
conditions that must be satisfied by an object in order for it to be their extension, but they 
contribute only their extension to propositional content. In short, the dthat operator turns 
descriptions into directly referential terms. The character of a proper name, then, could 
very well function as a description of its bearer combined with a dthat operator
56
. 
However, contrary to indexicals, which have more or less easily statable 
descriptive characters, finding which descriptions are good candidates for being the 
characters of proper names is a task of enormous difficulty. Since they function as 
characters, these descriptions have to be somehow cognitively accessible to all speakers 
who are competent with the name, and they must be responsible for determining its 
referent. The options for the characters of proper names seem to be the following: 
(1) Causal-historical chain description 
(2) Specific-name metalinguistic description 
(3) Generic-name metalinguistic description 
(4) Context-sensitive description 
Options (1) and (2) are not so distant from Kaplan’s original theory, for they 
treat names as non-indexicals, i.e., as expressions whose character is constant and whose 
content does not depend on certain parameters of the context. Options (3) and (4), on the 
other hand, treat proper names as indexicals, i.e., as expressions whose character is 
context-sensitive. Let us begin by examining option (1). 
Many people, including Kaplan, were convinced by Kripke’s causal-historical 
picture of how names refer. According to Kripke, a given tokening of a name refers to the 
object it does because it is part of chain that goes back to an initial baptism, when the name 
was first introduced as a name of the baptized object. This name is passed on from speaker 
to speaker, and it is in virtue of being causally connected to the object itself that my 
utterance of that name refers to the precise object it does. In short, the reference is fixed 
externally, by the name’s ancestry, not by some fact internal to my cognition.  
                                                          
55
 Cf. Kaplan (1989a), p. 521-22, and Kaplan (1989b), p. 578-82. Kaplan says that dthat should be 
understood as a true demonstrative, not as a real operator. For our purposes here, however, this does not 
make much difference. 
56
 Note that the dthat operator is not the same as the actually operator, which is usually appealed to by 
descriptivists about proper names to deal with Kripke’s objections. The former stays at the level of character, 
so to speak, while the latter carries over to content.  In other words, the actually operator just rigidifies a 
description; it does not turn it into a directly referential term as dthat. 
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It is also important to stress that, in this picture, names are individuated in 
terms of baptism ceremonies. So, two coreferential names are the same name if and only if 
they were introduced by the same ceremony. Conversely, two coreferential names are 
different if and only if they were introduced in the linguistic community by two different 
baptisms. Hence, to each name corresponds one and only one causal-historical chain (more 
like a tree, actually), which is originated at a baptism ceremony. A consequence of this 
view is that, for example, a noun like “Ludovic” will be systematically ambiguous: there is 
not a single name “Ludovic”, but as many different names – spelled identically – as there 
are baptism ceremonies. In fact, if the same person is named “Ludovic” by two distinct 
ceremonies, there will be two distinct names spelled “Ludovic”, not a single one57.  
Kaplan believes that the role of this causal chain is pre-semantic or, as he puts 
it, metasemantic
58
. This means that the causal chain is not somehow built into the meaning 
of a given proper name; it functions only to determine which name is being used, and 
hence which thing is being referred to. So, at a given occasion of discourse in which a 
name is used, contextual cues determine which causal chain is being exploited, and thus 
which name is being tokened, in the same way as contextual cues determine the meaning 
of an ambiguous expression such as “bank”. This is completely different from the way 
context determines the content of an indexical expression: for indexicals, the context-
sensitivity is built into their characters, and thus into their meanings, whereas names have 
a context-insensitive meaning. In other terms, the referent of a name is not determined in 
virtue of an aspect of its meaning, but pre-semantically, by the chain that brought the name 
to the speaker. Context is relevant only to determine which chain is being exploited. It does 
not include a parameter which the meaning of the name is sensitive to. In short, to Kaplan, 
causal chains merely fix the referent in Kripke’s sense; they are not encoded in the name’s 
meaning. 
Option (1) is the view that, contrary to Kaplan, causal chains are in fact 
encoded in the name’s meaning. More precisely, they are encoded at the level of character. 
So, the character of a name “N” would be given by a description such as “[dthat] the 
individual who lies at the other end of the historical chain that brought this token of ‘N’ to 
me”. As Kaplan puts it, such a theory will “regard the historical chain theory as a part of 
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 This is essentially Kaplan’s example of the mischievous Babylonian. Cf. Kaplan (1990). 
58
 Cf. Kaplan (1989b), p. 573. 
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semantics, as giving the meaning rather than as telling us how to discover it” (Kaplan, 
1989b, p. 574). If this is plausible, then names would have two layers of meaning: the 
character, which is given by a description of the causal chain that introduced the name in 
the community, and the content, which is just its referent. 
This is why “Spider-man is Peter Parker” and “Hesperus is Phosphorus” are 
informative sentences. Since those names have clearly distinct causal histories, they have 
distinct characters. If they have distinct characters, and character is tied to cognitive value, 
then they have different cognitive values. Voilà: “Spider-man is Peter Parker” and 
“Hesperus is Phosphorus” turn out to be informative despite having the same referent. 
There are mainly two problems with this solution. The first has nothing to do 
with Frege’s Puzzle, however. It is about the supposed cognitive role that causal chain 
descriptions can play. The characters of indexicals are more or less easily statable because 
they are rules of language that are known by the speakers. Put another way, the characters 
of indexicals are more intuitively conceived as linguistic meanings (or at least something 
that is derived from them) because they are, at least in some sense, grasped by every 
competent speaker of the language. And the descriptions that state these characters are 
fairly simple. Causal descriptions, on the other hand, are much more complex and seem 
much more cognitively demanding. It is certainly not very intuitive to say that causal 
descriptions are rules that have to be mastered by competent speakers for the correct use of 
names: they require substantive beliefs about baptisms, causal connections, linguistic 
communities, etc. These sorts of beliefs are obviously required for the linguistic practice in 
general. But so are beliefs about sounds, symbols, perceptual encounters, behaviors, etc., 
that are not built into meanings. The idea that the character of a name is a description of its 
causal chain, then, is very doubtful. Of course, this is far from being a knock-down 
argument against this proposal, but this view is certainly not in keeping with our intuition 
about what linguistic meanings are and the cognitive role they play. 
Second, and more seriously, this proposal does not solve Frege’s Puzzle for 
names even if it is correct. Consider this situation described by Kaplan: “I may introduce a 
new proper name word and send it on its journey. When it returns to me – perhaps slightly 
distorted phonologically by its trip through other dialects – I can competently take into my 
vocabulary without recognizing it as the very same word! Shocking!” (Kaplan, 1989a, p. 
563). If the view described above is right, in this case there is just one baptism ceremony, 
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so there is just one name with a single character, call it ‘N’. When I encounter this name 
again, it may be nevertheless informative to me to be told that “N is N”, even though I was 
the one who introduced it in the first place. The name does not even have to be 
phonologically distorted; it can be spelled and pronounced in the exact same way as I 
introduced it. This also occurs in Paderewski-like scenarios. It may be informative to me to 
be told that “Paderewski is Paderewski” even though both occurrences of the name exploit 
the same causal chain, and thus have the same character. How can this be possible? 
Option (1), then, seems barely tenable as a solution to Frege’s Puzzle. Option 
(2) seems a little bit more plausible, but it suffers from the same problem when it comes to 
explaining informativeness. This option presupposes much of the causal-historical picture 
of how names are individuated, but the descriptions that are conceived as characters of 
names are much less cognitively demanding than descriptions of causal chains. They are 
metalinguistic descriptions like “[dthat] the bearer of ‘N’”. As it seems clear, this 
description is a piece of knowledge that everyone acquires upon learning a new name, so 
they can more plausibly function as cognitively accessible characters. Note that, in option 
(2), names are specific, i.e., they are individuated in terms of the baptisms which 
introduced them. As explained earlier, there is no single name “Ludovic” with a single 
meaning, but many different names spelled “Ludovic”, each with one single meaning. We 
can express this fact by subscripting the names: “Ludovic1”, “Ludovic2”, Ludovic3”, etc. 
So, for example, the character of Ludovic1 would be “[dthat] the bearer of ‘Ludovic1’”, 
which would be different from “the bearer of ‘Ludovic2’”, and so on. This guarantees that 
the description picks out the right individual, because the causal chain determines which 
specific name is loaded into the character. This explains why it can be informative to be 
told that “Ludovic1 is Ludovic2”: their characters are given by different descriptions, since 
different names occur in them. However, Paderewski cases are unaccountable by this 
proposal. Since the causal chain pre-semantically individuates one single name 
“Paderewski”, the same characters would occur in both sides of “Paderewski is 
Paderewski”. This sentence should be trivial, but it is not. 
Let us now look at option (3). As I mentioned, this option treats names as 
indexicals. This is already very suspicious. As Kaplan says, “those who suggest that proper 
names are merely one species of indexical depreciate the power and the mystery of the 
causal chain theory” (Kaplan, 1989a, p. 563). However, let us give it a shot. In this view, a 
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generic name like “Ludovic” will have a single, context-sensitive character – “[dthat] the 
bearer of ‘Ludovic’” – which will refer to whoever is called “Ludovic” in the context of its 
use. In other words, this option attributes to the generic name “Ludovic” one single 
metalinguistic and context-sensitive meaning, which determines the content in a context. A 
generic name, then, functions exactly like pure indexicals such as “here” and “I”. Needless 
to say, this option is not very persuasive in its own right. Generic names do not appear to 
have meanings by themselves without being associated to a determined object; they are 
precisely that: generic. Moreover, if there is one single character for every occurrence of 
“Ludovic”, we will run into the same problems that gave rise to Braun’s revision of 
Kaplan’s theory. For instance, if we have an utterance of “Ludovic is taller than Ludovic”, 
we will have to say that the context shifts midsentence, or that the characters of each 
occurrence of “Ludovic” are different, so that different objects are determined by them; 
otherwise, this sentence will always come out false. In any case, either the character is the 
same and the context shifts, and hence there should not be any difference in cognitive 
value between the two occurrences of “Ludovic”, or their characters are different, and thus 
the character would not be able to explain the triviality of sentences like “Ludovic is 
Ludovic”. If this is right, then we can also rule out option (3) as an adequate explanation of 
cognitive value. 
This leaves with option (4). In this view, names function just like indexicals, 
but their characters vary from speaker to speaker or even for the same speaker in different 
occasions. Each speaker, then, attributes her own character to a given name at a given 
context, and this character determines the content. In a sense, this view is very similar to 
Fregean and Russellian descriptivism: each speaker associates one definite description with 
a name in a context of use, and this description determines the referent. Just like traditional 
descriptivism, in option (4) there is no single privileged description community-wise or 
even speaker-wise; as long as the referent remains the same, there is (apparently) no 
problem. The main difference is that, contrary to traditional descriptivism, these 
descriptions are not encoded in the propositional content of sentences containing names; 
they are turned into directly referential terms and remain only at the level of character. So, 
for instance, if I say “Socrates is a great person” and associate the description “the greatest 
soccer player from Ribeirão Preto” with “Socrates”, its character will be something like 
“[dthat] the greatest soccer player from Ribeirão Preto” for me. The content is just Socrates 
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himself. Similarly, my audience may associate different descriptions, and thus different 
characters, with the same name. In short, this view claims that characters vary 
contextually, given what sort of information the speaker has about the referent and what 
sort of information is relevant in the context of communication. This is why “Paderewski is 
Paderewski” can be informative: I associate different descriptions with each occurrence of 
the name, and thus the character of this sentence could be something like “[dthat] the 
pianist called ‘Paderewski’ is [dthat] the statesman called ‘Paderewski’”. The propositional 
content is just a self-identity, but the characters of the two occurrences of the name 
“Paderewski” are different, so it is an informative self-identity. And this also explains why 
the same sentence can be trivial: if I associate the same character to both occurrences of 
“Paderewski”, then “Paderewski is Paderewski” will turn out uninformative to me. 
In sum, then, this view claims that the characters of names are determined only 
in the speaker’s idiolect by the information she has, not by general rules of language. 
Moreover, proper names turn out to be mere place-holders for definite descriptions, for 
they do not have constant meanings at the level of character, much like the dthat operator 
itself. Because this view is so similar to Fregeanism and Russellianism about proper 
names, they solve Frege’s Puzzle more or less like in the same manner. Additionally, this 
view manages to avoid Kripke’s modal arguments, because the description associated to a 
name is not expressed at the level of content. These descriptions are also not merely 
rigidified: they are turned into genuine directly referential expressions by something like 
the dthat operator. Finally, contrary to Kaplan’s theory, characters of names will no longer 
be constant functions, but merely functions from contexts to contents just like any other 
indexical. 
However, despite avoiding Kripke’s modal argument, option (4) does not avoid 
his semantic argument. If it is my job to associate a description, and thus a character, to a 
name in an occasion of speech, then my utterance will determine the wrong object if I 
associate the wrong information with the name. Think of the name “Einstein”. If I 
associate the description “the father of the atomic bomb” with it, then its character will be 
“[dthat] the father of the atomic bomb” and would pick out whoever satisfies this 
description. This character, of course, does not determine Einstein, but Oppenheimer. 
Therefore, the proposition I express will be a singular proposition about Oppenheimer, and 
not one about Einstein. This, of course, runs counter well established externalist arguments 
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about reference determination for proper names. Moreover, we intuitively say that I have 
false beliefs about Einstein, not that I am thinking and saying things about Oppenheimer. If 
characters of proper names are determined internalistically, in my idiolect, then it is always 
possible for my utterances to determine the wrong objects if I have mistaken beliefs about 
them.  
Additionally, this picture makes communication very mysterious. If characters 
of names are potentially multiplied by all the speakers in a given situation, then how do we 
explain their grasp of what is said? If there is no significant overlap between the 
information speakers associate to the name uttered in a given occasion, then the route to 
reference will be so different for each of them that it seems very hard to explain how they 
arrive at the same content and know that they do so. In fact, this seems rather miraculous. 
As with indexicals, we intuitively say that is the job of the speaker to exploit a single 
character that must be grasped and interpreted by the audience. In short, reference seems to 
be a two-place relation between speaker (or expression-in-context) and reference, not an n-
place relation between every single person in a communication exchange and the referent. 
Of course, we may associate a huge body of information with a given name of an object, 
but to claim that we also express or display this information through an utterance of this 
name, even if via character, is hard to swallow. Worse yet, if I have conflicting 
individuating information about a given object, I refer successfully to it only if I happen to 
associate the right description when I use it; otherwise, I will refer to something else. Not 
even my own uses of the name will be consistent in this view. 
It seems, then, that all options for explaining the name version of Frege’ Puzzle 
in terms of character are flawed in some sense. They either fail to account for cognitive 
value or they seem semantically implausible. Remember also that claiming that names 
have characters and contents just like indexicals is already a major deviation from standard 
referentialism. This lends extra weight to the objections posed above. In the next section, I 
will briefly examine the purported solution in terms of reflexive content which, as we will 
see, fares no better than the solution via character. 
3.2 Names and reflexive content 
Perry offered two solutions to the name version of Frege’s Puzzle via reflexive 
content, one in Perry (1988) and the other in Perry (1997). Let us start with the former. In 
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that paper, Perry claims that there is a piece of information that is linked to “Cicero is 
Tully” that is not linked to “Cicero is Cicero” despite the fact that they express the same 
proposition: the metalinguistic information that “Cicero” and “Tully” stand for the same 
thing
59
. This information, then, is not expressed at the level of the official or truth-
conditional content, but only at the level of the reflexive content of an utterance of “Cicero 
is Tully”. In other terms, a speaker who is competent with both “Cicero” and “Tully” may 
nevertheless acquire new information upon being told that “Cicero is Tully”, and this 
information is expressed in the reflexive content by containing the very names “Cicero” 
and “Tully”. This is why “Cicero is Tully” is informative whereas “Cicero is Cicero” is 
not. 
This is all well, except for one thing: contrary to the reflexive content of 
indexical sentences, this metalinguistic information is not in any sense derived from the 
meanings of the names in question, i.e., from their rules of usage. Of course, the reflexive 
proposition “‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’ refer to the same thing” must be true if “Cicero is Tully” 
is true as well, but this proposition is not in any sense derived from the linguistic meanings 
of the expressions involved. It is information about English sentences and names. This is 
not even a solution in terms of applied linguistic meaning, as was the solution to the 
indexical version of the puzzle. In short, this is pre-semantic information. Perry, like 
Kaplan, believes that the only meaning of a name is its referent. Hence, if he wants to 
explain cognitive value in terms of meaning, he cannot appeal to this kind of metalinguistic 
information to do so. This information is simply outside the realm of semantics. In fact, 
this metalinguistic strategy is very similar to Salmon’s (1986) strategy for solving Frege’s 
Puzzle. As is well known, Salmon does not sympathize with the Fregean criterion of 
adequacy.  
In his (1988) paper, Perry was answering Wettstein’s (1986) challenge. He 
interpreted Wettstein as claiming that, since the propositional content of “Cicero is Cicero” 
and “Cicero is Tully” is identical, there is no difference whatsoever between their cognitive 
value. Thus, there is nothing for the direct reference theorist to worry about. Perry’s 
solution sketched above clearly meets this challenge. After all, there is a significant 
difference between the cognitive values of “Cicero is Cicero” and “Cicero is “Tully”, and 
this fact could possibly be explained by Perry’s reflexive content. But that is not what 
                                                          
59
 Cf. Perry (1988) p. 12. 
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Wettstein was claiming in that paper. He was claiming that it is not semantics’ business to 
explain cognitive value, not that there is no phenomena of cognitive value at all. And this 
challenge is not successfully met by Perry (1988), since his solution is not based on any 
semantic properties of proper names. Unfortunately, the solution he offered in his (1997) is 
not able to meet it either. Let us see why. 
In Perry (1997), his theory of reflexive content is a little bit different. He 
claims that, for an utterance g of the sentence “David uses LISP”, its reflexive content is 
something like 
R: There is a person x and a convention C such that 
i)  C is exploited by g; 
ii)  C permits one to designate x with “David”;  
iii) x uses LISP60. 
 A convention C for Perry is the convention that is established in a baptism 
ceremony. As he puts it, “When a person or thing is assigned a name, a permissive 
convention is established: that name may be used to designate that person” (Perry, 1997, p. 
6). So, when we use names, we are exploiting these conventions, and it is in virtue of them 
that we refer to the objects we do. Essentially, then, conventions C are things like Kripke’s 
causal-historical chains, which determine the referent of a given token of a name, and they 
are part of a given utterance’s reflexive content R. Furthermore, R is known by every 
competent speaker: even if we do not know who the referent of “David” is, we would still 
grasp R because we know how language works and how names refer. 
This is presumably why sentences like “Cicero is Tully” can be informative 
(Perry does not explicitly talks about these cases in that paper): these names exploit 
different conventions, C and C’, and this fact is expressed by the reflexive content of the 
sentence “Cicero is Tully”. Conversely, this also explains why “Cicero is Cicero” is trivial: 
the same convention is being exploited twice, and this information is encoded in its 
reflexive content. Since all competent speakers grasp reflexive contents effortlessly, this is 
not something too esoteric. Contents R like the above are easily available for the speaker’s 
cognition every time an utterance is produced. 
                                                          
60
 Cf. Perry (1997), p. 8. 
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However, like Kaplan, Perry believes that these conventions C are not in any 
sense an aspect of the meaning of the names they introduce. They are not like the 
characters of indexicals that, in a context, determine the referent. The determination of 
reference is done before any semantic evaluation. Conventions C, then, are pre-semantic, 
as I explained in section 3.1. I quote:  
The role of context in resolving the issues of which naming conventions are 
being exploited is quite different from its role with indexicals. In the case of 
indexicals, the meaning of a given expression determines that certain specific 
contextual relationships to the utterance and utterer—who is speaking, or to 
whom, or when—determine designation. Different facts are relevant for different 
indexicals, and the meaning of the indexical determines which. Names don’t 
work like this. The difference between “David” and “Harold” is not that they are 
tied, by their meanings, to different relationships to the utterance or utterer. The 
role of context is simply to help us narrow down the possibilities for the 
permissive conventions that are being exploited (Perry, 1997, p. 7, italics mine). 
 
As we can see, Perry believes that conventions C are not in any sense encoded 
at any level of the meaning of a proper name. They are external relations that fix its 
reference. Figuring out which relation is being exploited and thus which thing is being 
referred to is a matter of contextual ingenuity for sure. But this is not something that is 
determined by meanings, or even by applied meanings, as happens with indexical 
expressions. Discovering which name and which permissive convention is at play is like 
figuring out which sense of the word “bank” is intended in a given utterance of “Mary 
went to the bank”: there are no rules built into the meanings of “bank” that tell us which 
meaning is being intended in this situation. If this is correct, then Perry’s (1997) proposal 
may explain cognitive value all right, but not on semantic grounds. Wettstein’s challenge 
remains unscathed. 
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4. Conclusion 
 
It seems, then, that neither the character nor reflexive content are able to solve 
Frege’s Puzzle in any of its versions. If this is really the case, then maybe Wettstein (1986) 
is right: we have very good reasons to doubt Fregean adequacy criterion for semantics, i.e., 
the idea that cognitive value is an aspect of meaning. Of course, the arguments in this 
dissertation are far from being conclusive in this regard. They are not intended to criticize 
the Fregean approach directly. However, they show that unless the referentialists who 
accept the Fregean criterion of adequacy come up with completely new theoretical 
resources, they have little hope for dealing with Frege’s Puzzle on semantic grounds. 
Character and reflexive content are simply unable to explain all that needs to be explained. 
And if Wettstein is right regarding what semantics is about (and I think he is), 
we must radically reduce our expectations about this discipline. If the proper domain of 
semantics is only the referential truth conditions of sentences and their literal meanings, as 
it seems to be the case, then its role in a general theory of communication is much smaller 
than it was usually supposed, whereas the role of pragmatics is much bigger. In other 
terms, if the arguments in this dissertation point in the right direction, then it seems that the 
information we acquire through linguistic meanings alone is much more modest than we 
believed. The study of meaning, then, does not reveal so much about our thought as it is 
usually supposed. 
Moreover, Wettstein’s most polemic thesis is very friendly to semantic 
minimalism, i.e., the thesis that the literal meanings of sentences can be determined 
without any contextual intrusion. In other words, semantic minimalism defends that we 
should do semantics more formally, at the level of sentences, not at the level of utterances. 
Semantic minimalism, then, draws a sharp distinction between semantics and pragmatics, 
and this seems quite compatible with the rejection of the Fregean model of semantics. If 
the phenomena of cognitive value are accounted for by pragmatics and not by semantics, 
then the literal meanings of the sentences we utter have a much smaller role in our belief 
formation, and this is accommodated pretty well by minimalism. In sum, if we reject the 
Fregean criterion of adequacy, then a minimalist semantics becomes much more 
interesting, for it is not concerned with explaining anything that is not an aspect of 
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sentences as types and their literal meanings. But his is of course a matter for future 
investigations. 
All in all, I believe that the deep lesson to be learned here is that if we see 
meanings as objective and shared things (fitting in what Kaplan calls ‘consumerist 
semantics’) pertaining to a common realm of semantic facts as direct reference does, then 
they will never be as fine-grained enough to individuate cognitive value. In other words, if 
semantic properties are objectively assigned to expressions – whether at the level of 
sentences or at the level of utterances – they will never be able to accommodate precisely 
all the possible epistemic profiles of those expressions. There is always the possibility of 
the same semantic property producing distinct cognitive values for distinct speakers. 
Cognitive value, then, seems to be an inherently perspectival matter. Unless we have a 
perspectival – and thus subjectivist – semantics that reflects this fact, such as Fregean 
semantics, we cannot solve Frege’s Puzzle in terms of meaning. In short, we cannot meet 
Frege’s criterion of adequacy unless we put meanings back in the head. But we, as 
referentialists, do not want to do that. Frege’s criterion must go. 
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